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Climate change has emerged as one of the leading policy issues of the early 21st century. 
In response, a variety of policies and programs have been adopted encouraging renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and energy conservation. My dissertation consists of three research 
papers which evaluate two classes of modern energy policy in the United States: renewable 
energy mandates and behavioral nudges.  
The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is the most prominent state-level renewable 
energy policy in the United States and has been debated several times at the federal level. Using 
a fixed-effects panel data model I study the existing experience of the RPS to help inform the 
policy debate. In contrast with the previous literature that has predominantly studied the average 
effect of the RPS on renewable capacity investments I explore factors resulting in the 
heterogeneous effect of the RPS policy. Relying on a basic understanding the electric utility 
industry and the electricity dispatch process I provide insight into existing experience with the 
RPS.  
Spurred by political and economic barriers to adopting renewable energy policy, interest 
has increased in using motivational techniques informed by behavioral science to encourage 
reductions in energy consumption. Existing research has predominantly addressed residential 
energy consumption. The remainder of my dissertation applies well-established motivational 
techniques to the transportation sector. Using an experimental design, I test whether real-time 
feedback and social norms can encourage fuel efficient driving behavior. I find that real-time 
iv 
 
feedback has a large impact on fuel economy, particularly when aggregated across the entire 
vehicle fleet. I also find some evidence suggesting that social norms can encourage eco-driving, 
but perhaps more importantly, identify key challenges associated with using social norms in a 
transportation setting.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
CHANGING THE ENERGY PORTFOLIO? 
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD 
 
  
1.1 Introduction 
 
The past decade has witnessed the proliferation of policies promoting the development of 
renewable energy across the world. The motivation extends well beyond environmental concerns 
and includes a growing global demand for energy, the limited nature of fossil fuels, energy 
security, and more. With limited and inconsistent action by the United States federal 
government, state policy-makers have emerged as energy policy leaders making use of various 
policy mechanisms to encourage the development of renewable energy. The most prevalent is the 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) which requires a certain share of the state's electricity 
generation come from renewable energy sources. In 1998 only two states had adopted an RPS. 
By 2012, this number has risen to twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia.1 
 Economists have long argued for efficient price-based policies, such as carbon taxes, 
allowing renewable energy technologies to be more cost competitive with conventional fossil 
fuel technologies. However, these types of policies have been plagued by political constraints. 
Instead, the United States has opted for more inefficient, yet politically feasible, policies to 
promote electricity generated by renewable energy sources. The most notable policies are the 
                                                 1 These states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai’i, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. An additional eight states have voluntary goals. These states are: Indiana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, and West Virginia (Database of State Incentives for Renewables and 
Efficiency - DSIRE).  
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Production and Investment Tax Credits, direct subsidies to renewable energy, and the RPS, in 
essence, a technology mandate. Though these policies are inefficient, the RPS has nevertheless 
proliferated as the preferred state-level policy, and a national RPS has even been debated by 
Congress on more than one occasion. As the policy debate continues, it is important to help 
inform policy makers of the existing experience with these policies.  
With over half of the states having adopted the RPS, a literature evaluating its 
effectiveness at increasing the development of renewable energy has grown in recent years. 
However, the evidence remains decidedly mixed. Early research relied on case studies (e.g. 
Langniss and Wiser 2003, Wiser et al. 2005, Cory and Swezey 2007) or used other qualitative 
evaluation techniques (e.g. Wiser and Barbose 2008, Hurlbut 2008) revealing that while some 
states experienced rapid development of renewable energy, others had not. The first empirical 
work was done by Menz and Vachon (2006) and Adelaja and Hailu (2008) who both establish a 
positive relationship between the RPS and wind capacity using a cross-sectional analysis. Using 
panel data analysis Yin and Powers (2010) also estimate a positive relationship, although they 
consider renewable capacity more broadly. Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) and Shrimali and 
Kniefel (2011), however, both find a negative relationship between RPS adoption and renewable 
capacity. Carley (2009) is the only research to study renewable generation rather than capacity. 
She finds a positive relationship between the RPS and total renewable generation, but no effect 
on the share of renewable generation as a percent of total electricity generation.  
In this paper, I study the relationship between an RPS policy and renewable generation as 
a percent of total electricity generation. In contrast with the previous literature that has 
predominantly focused on identifying the average effect of the RPS on renewable capacity 
investments, I explore factors resulting in the heterogeneous effect of the implementation of the 
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RPS policy. Relying on a basic understanding of factors that yield a favorable market 
environment for renewable generation, and on a basic understanding of the electric utility 
industry and electricity dispatch process, I provide insight into existing experience with the RPS.  
I first consider the role of policy stringency, market conditions, and natural resources on 
the impact of the RPS on renewable generation. Yin and Powers (2010) show that more stringent 
policies requiring more new capacity are more effective. My results are consistent with this 
finding, suggesting that a more stringent policy results in a larger percentage share of renewable 
generation. However, policy alone is not the only factor influencing renewable generation. Even 
absent policy good renewable resource potential and high electricity prices are two factors that 
play a considerable role in the economic viability of a renewable energy project. My results 
provide evidence of a heterogeneous effect of RPS implementation on renewable generation 
under varying market conditions, but I do not find a heterogeneous effect based on renewable 
energy resource potential.  
Next I study the implementation of the RPS policy has a different effect on renewable 
generation by firm type and by renewable energy source. Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) 
study whether the effect differs by firm type but limit their analysis to electric utilities (including 
investor-owned and publicly-owned). However, wholesale suppliers of electricity (called 
Independent Power Producers) have historically specialized in renewable energy. Even in 2009, 
83% of electricity generated using renewable energy sources was generated by IPPs, compared 
with 17% by electric utilities. My results show that the RPS has had a significantly larger impact 
on the generation mix of IPPs compared with electric utilities, even though IPPs are not subject 
to RPS mandates. This finding may help explain some of the null results reported in the literature 
if they study the electric industry more broadly. In addition to exploring which types of firms 
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generate electricity using renewable energy sources, I also study whether the RPS has a 
heterogeneous effect on the various types of renewable energy sources. My results show that the 
increase in renewable generation can be attributed to wind. This is not a surprising result as wind 
is the most cost competitive of the renewable energy sources.    
Finally, I turn to studying the effect of RPS implementation on different fossil fuel 
energy sources, specifically coal and natural gas. The primary objective of an RPS policy is to 
increase electricity generation using renewable energy sources. However, there are numerous 
ancillary benefits, such as economic benefits, energy security, and environmental benefits, that 
are often central to the policy debate (Holt and Wiser 2007). Achieving these benefits relies on 
the displacement of fossil fuels, but some of these benefits vary with the type of fossil fuel that is 
displaced (e.g. coal versus natural gas). For example, the environmental benefits of an RPS are 
significantly larger if coal is displaced relative to natural gas. To my knowledge there is only one 
working paper on the displacement of fossil fuels as a result of an RPS policy (Tra 2010). 
However, Tra (2010) studies only investor-owned utilities and does not differentiate between 
types of fossil fuel.  
In the early years of the RPS the expectation was that natural gas would be displaced due 
to its relatively high marginal cost of production. However, recent empirical work suggests that 
the type of fuel displaced will depend on the load profile and existing generation mix at the time 
renewable generation occurs (e.g. Novan 2011, Kaffine et al. 2010, Callaway and Fowlie 2009). 
Using plant-level emissions data, Kaffine et al. (2010) show that wind generation displaces coal 
in regions where coal is a dominant energy source in the generation mix. Consistent with this 
emerging literature, I find that coal is displaced among high coal-producing RPS states. Given 
that the RPS has predominantly resulted in wind generation which occurs mostly at night, it is 
   
 5 
not unexpected that coal is displaced given that it is a base load energy source. Interestingly I do 
not find evidence of natural gas displacement. In fact, I find weak evidence that the share of 
natural gas generation increases in low natural gas producing RPS-states. This may be because 
states are investing in natural gas to manage the intermittency of renewable energy sources.  
In order to develop an understanding of the existing experience with the RPS policy, it is 
important to not only consider factors that might influence policy effectiveness, but also to 
consider the heterogeneous effect of RPS implementation on renewable and fossil fuel-based 
generation. As the RPS policy continues to manifest, academic researchers and policymakers 
alike should continue to work to gain a better understanding of the RPS and its influence on the 
energy portfolio. This knowledge should help to inform the policy debate surrounding the RPS.  
 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
In this section I present a conceptual framework of an RPS policy to guide the discussion 
of how the policy affects electricity generation using both renewable energy sources and fossil 
fuels. Following Fischer and Newell (2008), consider a representative firm that generates 
electricity using fossil fuels and is subject to an RPS mandate. To be in compliance the firm must 
purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) from a different firm that generates electricity using 
renewable energy sources. A REC is a tradable commodity representing the environmental 
attributes of a particular amount of renewable energy generation, typically one megawatt-hour. 
These environmental attributes are distinct from the underlying electricity and may be bought 
and sold separately (Bird and Holt 2005). Profits for the representative fossil fuel firm are: 
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                                                       𝜋𝐹 = 𝑃𝑒𝑄𝐹 − 𝐶𝐹(𝑄𝐹) − 𝑃𝑠𝑄𝑅                                                (1.1)  
 
where 𝑃𝑒 is the price of electricity,  𝑄𝐹 is the amount of electricity generated using fossil fuels, 
𝐶𝐹(𝑄𝐹) is the cost of generating electricity using fossil fuels, 𝑃𝑠 is the price of a REC, and 𝑄𝑅 is 
the total number of RECs purchased.  𝑄𝑅 is assumed to be equal to the total amount of electricity 
generated using renewable energy sources so that the demand for RECs is equal to the supply of 
RECs. 
Under the RPS, the fossil fuel firm faces the following constraint:  
                                                                              𝑄𝑅(𝑄𝑅+𝑄𝐹) ≥ 𝛼                                                         (1.2)  
 
where (𝑄𝑅 + 𝑄𝐹 ) is total electricity generation and 𝛼 is the percent of total electricity generation 
that use renewable energy sources.2 Assuming that this is a binding constraint, profits for the 
representative fossil fuel firm are: 
                                               𝜋𝐹 = 𝑃𝑒𝑄𝐹 − 𝐶𝐹(𝑄𝐹) − 𝑃𝑠 � 𝛼1 − 𝛼�𝑄𝐹                                        (1.3) 
 
In the presence of an RPS this firm must ensure � 𝛼
1−𝛼
� RECs for every unit of generation 
(Fischer and Newell 2008). The firm maximizes profits with respect to 𝑄𝐹 yielding the following 
first-order condition: 
                                                 
2 Note that when just considering the supply side, the RPS mandate could be achieved through a reduction in fossil 
fuel-based generation. However, the electricity market continuously balances supply and demand such that reducing 
fossil fueled-generation to satisfy RPS mandates is an impractical alternative. However, Demand-Side Management, 
energy efficiency, and energy conservation programs which reduce total electricity demand (and fossil fueled-
generation) would also reduce the amount of renewable generation needed to satisfy RPS mandates.   
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                                             𝜕𝜋𝐹
𝜕𝑄𝐹
= 0  →  𝑃𝑒 = 𝐶𝐹′(𝑄𝐹) + 𝜑                                                    (1.4) 
 
where  𝜑 = 𝑃𝑠 � 𝛼1−𝛼�. In this framework, the RPS policy imposes an implicit tax on fossil fueled-
generation (𝜑). Ceteris paribus, the RPS policy will result in the displacement of fossil fuels.  
Next, consider a representative firm that generates electricity using renewable energy 
resources. For each unit of renewable generation the firm receives a production subsidy (𝑃𝑠) 
equal to the price of a REC. Profits for a representative renewable firm are: 
                                                       𝜋𝑅 = 𝑃𝑒𝑄𝑅 − 𝐶𝑅(𝑄𝑅) + 𝑃𝑠𝑄𝑅                                                (1.5) 
 
where 𝑃𝑒 is the price of electricity, 𝑄𝑅 is total electricity generation using renewable energy 
sources, and 𝐶𝑅(𝑄𝑅) is the cost of generating electricity using renewable energy sources. The 
firm maximizes profits with respect to 𝑄𝑅 yielding the following first-order condition: 
 
                                             𝜕𝜋𝑅
𝜕𝑄𝑅
= 0  →  𝑃𝑒 = 𝐶𝑅′(𝑄𝑅) − 𝑃𝑠                                                    (1.6) 
 
In this framework, an RPS policy provides an implicit subsidy for each unit of renewable 
generation produced (𝑃𝑠). Ceteris paribus, the RPS policy will result in the development of 
renewable energy.  
This conceptual framework reveals that the RPS will result in an increase in the share of 
renewable generation and a decrease in the share of fossil fuel-based generation. Furthermore, as 
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the policy requirement increases, the implicit tax and subsidy increase, resulting in more 
electricity generation using renewable energy sources and less electricity generation using fossil 
fuels. However, this simple framework does not consider specific elements of policy design that 
will influence effectiveness (for example, that equation (1.2) is actually a binding constraint), nor 
does it differentiate between the various types of renewable or fossil fuel energy resources.  
 
1.3 Empirical Methodology 
 
To test the relationship between RPS policy-adoption and electricity generation using 
renewable and fossil fuel energy sources, I use a fixed-effects panel data model with state-
specific time trends for the fifty U.S. states between 1998 and 2009. This time period covers the 
adoption of twenty-eight of the twenty-nine RPS policies.3 Table 1.1 provides a list of each state 
RPS policy, as well as the year it was adopted and the target percentage share and year (e.g. 20% 
by 2020).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Iowa’s Alternative Energy Law was adopted in 1983 but was not in effect until 1997 due to legal battles (DSIRE).  
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Table 1.1 Renewable Portfolio Standard 
 
State Year Adopted Target Size (%) Terminal Year 
Arizona 2001 15 2025 
California 2002 33 2020 
Colorado 2005 30 2020 
Connecticut 1998 27 2020 
Delaware 2005 25 2025 
Hawai'i 2004 40 2030 
Iowa 1997a 105 MW (~2%) 2000 
Illinois 2007 25 2025 
Kansas 2009 20 2020 
Maine 2007b 10 2017 
Maryland 2004 20 2022 
Massachusetts 2002 22.1 2020 
Michigan 2009 10 2015 
Minnesota 2007 30 2020 
Missouri 2009 15 2021 
Montana 2005 15 2015 
Nevada 1997 25 2025 
New Hampshire 2007 23.8 2025 
New Jersey 1999 20.38 2020 
New Mexico 2004 20 2020 
New York 2004 29 2015 
North Carolina 2007 12.5 2021 
Ohio 2008 25 2025 
Oregon 2007 25 2025 
Pennsylvania 2005 18 2020 
Rhode Island 2004 16 2019 
Texas 1999 5880 MW (~5%) 2014 
Washington 2007 15 2020 
Washington D.C. 2006 20 2020 
Wisconsin 2000 10 2015 
a Originally passed in 1983 the mandate was delayed until 1997 due to legal challenges. 
b Originally passed in 2000 with a 30% target which already exceeded existing eligible renewable 
generation. Target and year reflects mandate for new renewables. 
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The empirical specification models the share of generation by energy source as a percent 
of total electricity generation by the electric power sector conditional on the RPS policy, 
electricity market characteristics, environmental policy and political attitudes, and 
socioeconomic characteristics. The empirical model is specified as follows:  
                                  𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡) + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                             (1.7) 
 
To account for national trends I include year fixed effects (𝛾𝑡). For example, the federal 
Production Tax Credit, a highly influential federal renewable energy policy, is accounted for 
through year fixed effects.  To account for state-specific characteristics that are time invariant 
(e.g. renewable resource potential) I include state fixed effects (𝛼𝑖). However, there are other 
factors that may influence renewable energy deployment that change over time within a state. To 
capture time-varying trends within a state I include a state-specific time trend (𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡). Omitting 
this trend could bias the estimates if such factors are correlated with the RPS policy. A potential 
concern is that the inclusion of a state-specific time trend may result in multicollinearity if the 
relationship between the RPS and state-specific time trends is strong. To address this concern I 
regress the RPS policy variable on the state-specific time trend. The adjusted R-squared is 0.69 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a major concern.4,5 I estimate the model using least 
squares.6 Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
                                                 
4 In Appendix A I show results of the main model with and without time trends. The estimated coefficient increases 
and becomes statistically significant when including state-specific time trends. This suggests that state-specific time 
trends account for factors that have a positive influence on the share of renewable generation and is negatively 
correlated with the RPS policy.  
5 There may also be concern regarding multicollinearity with other covariates. When I regress the RPS policy on 
additional covariates the adjusted R-squared is 0.41 suggesting that multicollinearity between the RPS policy and 
covariates is not a concern.  
6 I use the Stata program xtivreg2 which allows for multi-way clustering (discussed further in this section) in a fixed-
effects panel data model (Schaffer 2010).  
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1.3.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable, 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 is measured as the percentage of total electricity generated 
by the electric power sector using renewable energy sources in state i in year t.7,8 Most of the 
previous literature has focused on renewable capacity or share of renewable capacity, limiting 
the research question to one of renewable energy investments. In this paper I am interested in the 
actual deployment of renewable energy sources. Because RPS policies are explicitly designed to 
increase the share of renewables relative to other energy sources, and not just the total amount, I 
construct the variable as the percentage share. 9,10 Dividing by total electricity generation also 
normalizes the outcome variable controlling for differences in market size across states. When 
studying renewable generation I include wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass energy sources.11 
When studying fossil fuel displacement the dependent variable is measured as the percentage of 
total electricity generated using coal or natural gas. Data on electricity generation come from the 
Energy Information Administration's state electricity database. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The electric power sector includes: investor-owned utilities, publicly-owned utilities, and independent power 
producers.  
8 The distribution of the dependent variable is skewed with a lower bound of zero. Refer to Appendix B for a 
discussion of alternative estimation strategies, such as Tobit. 
9 Only two RPS policies mandate an increase in capacity rather than a percentage share of generation: Texas and 
Iowa (DSIRE). 
10 I also estimate a model where the outcome variable is measured as the log of total generation (megawatt-hours) to 
identify whether the implementation of the RPS policy increases the growth rate of renewable generation. As 
expected, I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the RPS policy and the percentage 
change of renewable generation.  
11 Biomass includes only wood and wood derived fuels as reported by the EIA. I do not include hydroelectricity 
because not all RPS policies consider hydroelectricity an eligible renewable energy source.  
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1.3.2 Policy variable 
 
I construct the policy variable of interest, 𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡, as a binary variable equal to one when a 
state enacts an RPS policy, and zero otherwise. Researchers have used various methods for 
constructing the policy variable, including the binary construct (e.g. Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
2011, Carley 2009). For example, Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) use requirements outlined in 
legislation and linearly interpolate backwards to the year of policy adoption. Yin and Powers 
(2010) construct a measure which explicitly accounts for elements of the policy design that are 
expected to influence the strength of an RPS. I use a binary variable because I am concerned 
with using a construct that incorporates specific design features of the RPS policy and the 
implications for endogeneity bias. While the empirical approach outlined above assumes that the 
RPS policy is exogenous, it is clear that these policies are not adopted or designed at random.  
Unobserved factors that influence RPS adoption and policy design are also likely to influence 
renewable generation.12 The question of endogeneity then becomes much more complex, going 
from one of policy adoption to one of specific features of policy design. As a result, I have opted 
to use the more simplistic binary construct. I discuss endogeneity in more detail in section 6. All 
information on the RPS policy was extracted from the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency. 
  
 
 
                                                 
12 For example, Colorado’s RPS was adopted in 2004 with a target of 10% by 2020. In 2007, this target was 
increased to 20% and again in 2010 to 30% (DSIRE). While many factors influenced the decision to increase the 
RPS mandate, it is telling that renewable generation increased from 0.5% in 2004 to 2.4% in 2007, and up to 6.3% 
by 2009. It would be difficult to argue against reverse causality.  
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1.3.3 Covariates  
 
The main empirical model specified in equation (1.7) includes covariates that are 
expected to influence renewable or fossil-fueled generation, or the adoption of an RPS policy. In 
particular, I control for various characteristics of a state’s electricity market, environmental 
policy and political attitudes, and socioeconomic factors. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2 Summary statistics  
(N=600)  
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Percent Renewable 1.48 3.00 0 19.44 
Percent Renewable (Utilities) 0.65 3.95 0 41.64 
Percent Renewables (IPPs) 15.05 28.02 0 100 
Percent Geothermal 0.27 1.16 0 7.91 
Percent Biomass 0.63 2.28 0 19.44 
Percent Solar 0.01 0.05 0 0.46 
Percent Wind 0.57 1.41 0 14.74 
Percent Natural Gas 16.65 20.49 0 99.66 
Percent Coal 10.11 16.62 0 99.57 
     Price of Electricity (Lag, Log) 2.00 0.31 1.35 3.37 
Deregulation 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Import ratio (lag) -0.24 0.59 -2.90 0.56 
Percent Other Energy Sources1 (lag) 93.53 13.64 13.87 99.99 
Percent Other Energy Sources2 (lag) 77.66 25.13 0.04 99.89 
Percent Other Energy Sources3 (lag) 44.31 28.12 0.31 99.77 
Regulation Index 0.74 0.83 0 3 
Financial Incentive Index 0.95 0.90 0 3 
Disclosure 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Conservative Ideology (lag) 0.05 0.25 -0.52 0.65 
GSP per capita (log) 10.57 0.18 10.16 11.09 
Unemployment rate 5.00 1.61 2.27 13.30 
     Wind Potential 219138 379316 0 1901530 
Natural Gas Production (percent of US total) 1.73 4.78 0 32.54 
Coal Production (percent of US total) 1.99 5.47 0 40.1 
1 Other energy sources includes: coal, natural gas, nuclear, and hydroelectricity. 2 Other energy sources includes: 
coal, nuclear and hydroelectricity. 3 Other energy sources includes: natural gas, nuclear and hydroelectricity. 
   
    
The empirical model includes characteristics of a state's electricity market that may affect 
the development of renewable energy or the displacement of fossil fuels. Omitting these 
variables from the model would bias the estimated parameter for the RPS policy. The four 
electricity market covariates included are: average price of electricity, import ratio, electricity 
market deregulation, and the percent of generation attributed to other major energy sources. 
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The price of electricity may influence electricity generation using renewable energy 
sources. On the one hand, a higher price of electricity may lead electric utilities to limit 
investment in expensive renewable energy systems and increase investment in cheaper energy 
sources. On the other hand, a higher price of electricity may motivate investments in alternate 
energy sources and has the potential to make renewable energy investments economically 
feasible. I include a lagged measure of the real price of electricity to avoid issues of reverse 
causality. 13 The price of electricity is averaged across sectors and is measured in cents per 
kilowatt-hour. This data is available from the EIA’s State Energy Data System.  
A state that relies heavily on imported electricity may have a stronger incentive to 
develop renewable energy resources to reduce its energy dependence (Yin and Powers 2010). 
However, states that are dependent on imported electricity may face constrained transmission 
grids presenting a barrier to the development of renewable energy. I include a lagged measure for 
net imports calculated by taking the difference between total retail sales and total electricity 
generation and dividing by total retail sales.   
The model also includes a binary variable indicating whether a state's electricity market 
has undergone deregulation, equal to one if a state has undergone deregulation and zero 
otherwise. There is no clear consensus regarding the effect of deregulation on the development 
of renewable energy. On the one hand, deregulation may result in traditional price competition 
increasing investment in cost competitive fossil fuels relative to renewable energy. On the other 
hand, deregulation may enhance consumer choice leading retail electricity providers to 
differentiate their product by highlighting the environmental attributes of the electricity (Delmas 
                                                 
13 I convert nominal prices to real prices using the consumer price index provided by the United States Department 
of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
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et al. 2007). In this case, deregulation may increase the development of renewable energy and 
displace fossil fuels. Data on electricity deregulation come from the EIA.  
Finally, it is important to take into consideration the contributions of other energy sources 
used to generate electricity. For example, during this time period, the United States experienced 
a natural gas boom. In 1998, natural gas accounted for an average of 12% of total electricity 
generation. By 2009, this number had increased to 21%. While almost all states have 
experienced an increase in natural gas used for electricity generation, the increase has varied by 
state. For example, Colorado experienced an 18 percentage point increase between 1998 and 
2009, while Iowa only experienced a 1 percentage point increase. If, for example, natural gas 
increased more in states with an RPS policy, not accounting for changes in natural gas may 
underestimate the effect of the RPS on renewable generation and overestimate the effect of the 
RPS on coal generation. I create a measure for the share of total electricity generation using coal, 
natural gas, hydro, and nuclear.14    
The presence of environmental policies and corresponding political support are likely to 
be positively associated with the development of renewable energy and the displacement of 
fossil fuels. I include as covariates a number of alternative state-level renewable energy policies. 
Not including these variables would incorrectly attribute any increase in renewable generation, 
or decrease in fossil fuel-based generation, to the RPS policy. I consider six policies in total 
which include both regulations and financial incentives: the public benefits fund, a mandatory 
green power option, interconnection standards, sales tax exemptions, corporate tax exemptions, 
                                                 
14 When studying coal I exclude coal from this measure and when studying natural gas I exclude natural gas.  
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and property tax exemptions.15 Various combinations of these policies have been used in the 
RPS empirical evaluation literature (e.g. Delmas 2011, Carley 2009).  
Similar to Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) I also include one broader environmental 
policy. Some states require utilities to disclose to their customers their fuel-mix percentages and, 
in some cases, emissions. I would expect states with disclosure policies may be motivated to 
increase renewable generation and decrease fossil fuel-based generation. The disclosure policy 
variable is constructed as a binary variable equal to one for each year the policy is enacted and 
zero otherwise. Information on disclosure policies is also retrieved from DSIRE. 
Finally, I also consider the political ideology of state legislators as a pro-environmental 
ideology is likely to have a positive effect on renewable generation and a negative effect on 
fossil fuel-based generation. The measure I use is broadly used in the political science literature 
and was recently used by Cragg and Kahn (2009) in a political economy study of carbon 
legislation. The measure, “dw-nominate,” estimates a political ideology score based on all 
congressional roll call votes. A more positive score reflects a more conservative ideology. 
Because state representatives with a conservative ideology are less likely to adopt an RPS policy 
or other policies promoting renewable generation, I use the lagged version of “dw-nominate.” 
This data comes from the Voteview website.16  
                                                 
15 Public benefits funds (or system benefits charge) collect money through a small surcharge on electricity 
consumption to support renewable energy, energy efficiency and low-income energy programs. The mandatory 
green power option requires electric utilities to give consumers the option of buying electricity that is generated 
using renewable energy. Interconnection standards specify the technical and contractual procedures for customer-
sited generation. The financial incentives provide tax credits for installing a renewable energy system or generating 
electricity using renewable energy sources.  
16 Researchers have used a variety of measures for political ideology. The most prevalent is the League of 
Conservation Voter’s National Environmental Scorecard (e.g. Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011, Shrimali and 
Kneifel 2011, Yin and Powers 2010, Carley 2009). Other measures used include Sierra Club membership or political 
affiliation of persons in government (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011, Carley 2009). I test the robustness of my 
results using these measures in Appendix E. 
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I include two socioeconomic covariates: real gross state product per capita and the 
unemployment rate. I would expect that GSP per capita will have a positive effect on both 
renewable and fossil fuel-based generation while unemployment will have a negative effect on 
both. Data on gross state product come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and data on 
unemployment come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 
1.4 Renewable energy result 
 
In Figure 1.1 I display the percent of electricity generation by renewable energy sources 
for RPS and non-RPS states, where an RPS state had adopted the policy by 2009 and a non-RPS 
state had not.  
Figure 1.1 Renewable generation in the United States 
 
Perhaps the most notable feature is that both lines trend upward. With declining costs and 
favorable federal policies, renewable generation has been increasing dramatically across the 
nation. Between 1998 and 2009 the share of renewable energy sources in the generation mix 
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increased by 1.4 percentage points in non-RPS states. In RPS states the increase was 2.3 
percentage points. It is also important to note that the percentage share of renewables is larger for 
RPS states than non-RPS states suggesting there may be selection bias. However, this difference 
is statistically insignificant in 1998. One objective of this paper is to determine whether the RPS 
is positively associated with the share of renewables in the generation mix. In Figure 1.1, the 
difference between RPS and non-RPS states in 2009 compared to 1998 provides descriptive 
evidence of a positive association. I estimate the empirical model described in equation (1.7) to 
statistically test this relationship. I report these regression results in Table 1.3.  
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Table 1.3 Renewable energy 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RPS 0.61*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.24) 
Price of Electricity 
(Lag, Log) 
-1.56*** -1.57*** -1.59*** -1.59 -1.59* 
(0.55) (0.55) (0.57) (0.95) (0.95) 
Deregulation -0.30 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 (0.36) (0.40) (0.40) (0.79) (0.76) 
Import ratio (lag) 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.87 
(0.58) (0.59) (0.58) (0.94) (0.94) 
Percent of Other 
Generation (lag) 
-0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Interconnection 
Standard  
-0.28*** -0.30*** -0.30** -0.30* 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
Public Benefits Fund  
0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.20) (0.17) 
Green Power Program  
-0.17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 
 
(0.31) (0.32) (0.45) (0.47) 
Corporate Tax  
0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.33) (0.30) 
Sales Tax  
0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.28) (0.27) 
Property Tax  
-0.53*** -0.52*** -0.52 -0.52 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.34) (0.33) 
Disclosure  
-0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.32) (0.32) 
Conservative Ideology 
(lag)  
-0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.34) (0.36) 
GSP per capita (log)   
-0.96 -0.96 -0.96 
  
(2.01) (2.99) (2.87) 
Unemployment rate   
-0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
    (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) 
Cluster state No No No Yes Yes 
Cluster region-year No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%  Note: N=600. The dependent variable is the percent of total generation attributed to renewable 
energy sources (0-100). All specifications include a state-specific time trend and state and year fixed 
effects.  
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The first three specifications of Table 1.3 add covariates for electricity market 
characteristics, environmental policy and political attitudes, and socioeconomic characteristics. 
Conditional on these covariates, I find a positive and highly statistically significant relationship 
between the adoption of an RPS policy and the percentage share of renewable generation. In 
particular, I find that in states with an RPS policy renewable generation accounts for 0.72 
percentage points more of total generation compared with states that do not have an RPS policy.  
While this coefficient may at first seem like a small effect, there are a few important 
points worth noting. First, this estimate represents the average increase in the renewable share of 
the generation mix for states with an RPS relative to non-RPS states. As shown in Figure 1, 
renewable generation has increased dramatically over the past decade in both RPS and non-RPS 
states. This rapid development of renewable energy in non-RPS states suggests that the 
differential effect for RPS states relative to non-RPS states will be smaller than if renewable 
generation in non-RPS states had remained constant. Second, the RPS has incremental targets 
such that the average mandate for this time period is just 1.2%. Third, the types of energy 
sources that are eligible to satisfy RPS mandates vary by state. While the dependent variable 
includes solar, geothermal, wind, and wood-based biomass, there are many other energy sources 
that may be eligible in a given state. For example, all states allow small scale hydro facilities and 
landfill gas, but these are not captured in my measure. Fourth, almost all states can satisfy their 
RPS mandate using Renewable Energy Credits based on out-of-state generation rather than 
investing in their own renewable generation facilities.17 Finally, while some states are meeting 
and even exceeding RPS mandates, others are falling short (Bespalova 2011).  
                                                 
17 Only three states require in-state generation: Hawai’i, Nevada, and Texas. For the remaining states, electric 
utilities can either purchase RECs from qualifying producers or directly invest in a renewable energy system. 
However, direct investment by electric utilities has been limited. Even in 2009, only 12% of additions to renewable 
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Specifications (1)-(3) in Table 1.3 assume that the errors are independent and identically 
distributed. However, in a state-year panel setting the errors may not be independent along one 
or more dimensions. Failure to account for this dependence can result in under-estimated 
standard errors and over-rejection using standard hypothesis testing (Cameron et al. 2011). 
Researchers have used state and year fixed effects in an attempt to control for biased standard 
errors (Peterson 2009). However, Bertrand et al. (2004) show that including state and year fixed 
effects may not eliminate the bias and recommend also clustering the error term at the state-level 
to account for within-state serial correlation (i.e. allowing cov(εit, εis)≠0). Cameron et al. (2011) 
further suggest that if geographic-based spatial correlation is present that the error term should be 
clustered at the year-level to account for within-year across-state correlation (i.e. allowing 
cov(εit, εjt)≠0). Intuitively we might expect that the errors in the model specified by equation 
(1.7) are correlated along both dimensions. I perform a test for serial correlation (Wooldridge 
2002) and a test for contemporaneous correlation (Pesaran 2004) and in both cases reject the null 
hypothesis of no correlation.18  In specification (4) of Table 1.3 the errors are clustered at the 
state-level, and in specification (5) the errors are clustered at both the state and region-year 
levels.19 When clustering at the state and region-year levels the relationship between the RPS 
policy and the share of renewable generation remains statistically significant at the 1% level.   
Consistent with other literature, the regression results reported in Table 1.3 indicate a 
negative relationship between the price of electricity and the share of renewable energy sources 
in the generation mix (e.g. Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011, Yin and Powers 2010, Carly 
                                                                                                                                                             
capacity were by electric utilities with the remainder being owned predominantly by Independent Power Producers 
(EIA). Refer to Appendix C for further discussion of Renewable Energy Credits.  
18 I use the Stata programs xtserial  and xtcsd.   
19 Because my panel only includes 12 years I cluster at the region-year level rather than at the year level. Regions are 
REC market regions as defined in Bird et al. (2010). In Appendix D I present results where I use two additional 
region designations: electric reliability coordinators and regional transmission organizations. I also present results 
where I cluster at the year level for comparison. The results remain statistically significant at the 1% levels across all 
specifications.   
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2009). Other results have the expected signs, though they are statistically insignificant. For 
example, I find a negative relationship between electricity deregulation and renewable generation 
suggesting that price competition dominated over product differentiation. I also find a positive 
relationship between net imports and renewable generation suggesting that states relying heavily 
on imported electricity invest more in renewable energy sources. The estimated coefficients on 
alternative renewable energy policies are all statistically insignificant except for interconnection 
standards, which is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The negative 
coefficient is a surprising result. The interconnection standard is aimed at fostering the 
development of customer-sited renewable generation and in most cases the RECs are then 
transferred or sold to the utility. While this suggests electric utilities may not need to increase 
renewable generation as much, ceteris paribus, I would expect total generation to decrease 
resulting in an increase in the share of renewables. Regression results reveal a negative 
coefficient on the measure for conservative ideology, the expected sign although it is statistically 
insignificant.20 The coefficients for socioeconomic covariates are statistically insignificant. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient is negative for per capita gross state product though this finding is 
consistent with previous literature (e.g. Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011, Yin and Powers 
2010).  
 
1.4.1 Policy stringency, market conditions, and natural resources  
 
In the previous section I estimated the average impact of RPS policy adoption on the 
renewable share of the generation mix. However, there are many factors that will influence the 
                                                 
20 I present results in Appendix E using alternative measures for political ideology that are common in the literature 
(e.g. Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011, Yin and Powers 2010) and find that my results are robust.  
   
 24 
impact of an RPS on renewable deployment. In this section I consider the stringency of the RPS, 
the role of electricity prices, and wind resource potential. I hypothesize that the increase in the 
share of renewable generation will be larger for states with a more stringent RPS policy. Further, 
high electricity prices and good wind resource potential can increase the economic viability of a 
renewable energy project, even absent policy. I expect that an RPS paired with high electricity 
prices or good wind resource potential will have a larger impact on renewable generation.  
To test whether the implementation of the RPS on renewable generation varies with these 
institutional, market, and natural conditions, I construct a binary variable for each quartile of 
these variables. Quartiles for RPS stringency are based on the legislated mandates. Wind 
resource potential measures the potential wind capacity that could be installed in available windy 
areas. This data come from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. In Table 1.4 I report 
regression results where quartiles one, two, and three are interacted with the RPS policy variable. 
The omitted category is the fourth quartile so coefficients can be interpreted relative to this 
category. The estimated coefficient of the policy variable represents the fourth quartile.  
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Table 1.4 Heterogeneity in policy effectiveness 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Base 
RPS 
Policy 
Stringency 
Price of 
Electricity 
Wind 
Potential 
RPS 0.75*** 1.55*** 1.47*** 0.98* 
(0.24) (0.49) (0.43) (0.55) 
RPS x Quartile 3  
-0.55 -0.94** -0.69 
 
(0.34) (0.38) (0.64) 
RPS x Quartile 2  
-0.78* -1.34*** 0.52 
 
(0.41) (0.47) (0.80) 
RPS x Quartile 1  
-0.76* -0.79 -0.74 
 
(0.41) (0.50) (0.78) 
Quartile 3   
0.65 
 
  
(0.41) 
 
Quartile 2   
0.60 
 
  
(0.51) 
 
Quartile 1   
0.73 
     (0.56)   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%  Note: N=600. The dependent variable is the percent of 
total generation attributed to renewable energy sources (0-100). All 
specifications include state and year fixed effects and state time trends. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state and region-year levels. Estimated coefficients of 
additional covariates are not reported.  
The results suggest that an RPS policy is significantly more effective when the mandate 
is stringent. In specification (2) when the policy mandate is in the top quartile, the share of 
renewable generation increases by 1.55 percentage points. The differential effects for the third, 
second, and first quartiles are -0.55, -0.78, and -0.76 respectively, with the effects for the second 
and first quartiles being statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Specification (3) reveals that market conditions do result in a heterogeneous effect of the 
RPS policy on renewable generation. I find that the RPS has the largest influence on renewable 
generation in states with the highest and lowest prices, but has had a significantly smaller impact 
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in states where electricity prices are in the mid-range.21 This is somewhat surprising as I 
expected RPS state with high electricity prices to increase renewable generation relative to RPS 
states with low electricity prices. While there is no definitive trend regarding how electricity 
prices influence renewable generation, it is clear that the effect does vary with market conditions. 
Specification (4) shows a large and positive effect of an RPS in a state with high wind 
potential, though the differential effects are all statistically insignificant. This suggests that wind 
potential has not resulted in a heterogeneous effect of RPS implementation on renewable 
generation. 22 This is an important finding as a common political concern with a national RPS 
surrounds the ability to satisfy RPS mandates when renewable energy resource potential is low 
and the redistribution of wealth due to REC trading from areas of low resource potential to areas 
of high resource potential. While my study does not address this specifically, it does provide 
evidence that at least in the early years of the RPS, in-state renewable generation by RPS states is 
not significantly different when wind potential is high or low.   
 
1.4.2 Firm type 
 
While wholesale electricity suppliers, IPPs, are not subject to RPS mandates they have 
historically specialized in renewable generation. As states previous, in 2009, approximately 83% 
of electricity generated using renewable energy sources was generated by IPPs compared with 
17% by electric utilities. However, the previous literature has paid little attention to the 
differences in firm type. Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) consider differences in publicly-
                                                 
21 Electricity price ranges by quartile are: 4-6.7, 6.7-8.3, 8.4-11.018, and 11.019-39. All prices are measured in cents 
per kilowatt-hour.  
22 It is important to note that wind potential is never zero in a state with an RPS, though it is near zero. For example, 
Connecticut has a potential installed wind capacity of just 9 MW. Similarly, Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode 
Island all have RPS policies but less than 150 MW potential of installed wind capacity.  
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owned versus investor-owned utilities, both subject to RPS mandates but with different 
incentives to comply. They find that IOUs are more responsive to the RPS compared with POUs.  
To study how the RPS policy has impacted the generation mix of IPPs and electric 
utilities (including both IOUs and POUs) I estimate the main empirical specification where the 
dependent variable is limited to generation by firm-type. I report the regression results in Table 
1.5. The results show that the increase in the impact of the RPS policy on a state’s electricity 
generation mix can be entirely attributed to IPPs. The percentage share of renewable generation 
by electric utilities increases by 0.47 percentage points and is statistically insignificant, while the 
increase by IPPs is 12.85 percentage points and statistically significant at the 5% level.23 There is 
some anecdotal evidence suggesting that electric utilities are beginning to take on an ownership 
role (Wiser and Barbose 2008). While I do not find evidence of this, as the RPS requirements 
increase over time it will be interesting to see how the role of IPPs evolves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 If renewable generation by IPPs was very small at the baseline, a 12.85 percentage point increase may actually 
result in a smaller amount of total generation than the 0.47 percentage point increase by electric utilities, if 
renewable generation by utilities was relatively large at the baseline. However, average renewable generation (as a 
percentage share and in totals) by IPPs greatly exceeds that of electric utilities, confirming that much of the increase 
in renewable generation can be attributed to IPPs.  
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Table 1.5 Firm type 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 All Utilities IPPs 
RPS 0.75*** 0.48 13.23** (0.24) (0.35) (6.35) 
Price of Electricity (Lag, 
Log) 
-1.59* 0.96 -12.57 
(0.95) (1.46) (8.56) 
Deregulation -0.37 0.39 3.37 (0.76) (0.28) (4.62) 
Import ratio (lag) 0.87 0.36 10.34 (0.94) (0.47) (7.08) 
Percent of Other 
Generation (lag) 
-0.09*** -0.00 0.08 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.16) 
Interconnection Standard -0.30* -0.23 -5.43 (0.16) (0.15) (4.59) 
Public Benefits Fund 0.21 -0.11 7.48 (0.17) (0.42) (4.57) 
Green Power Program -0.19 -0.47 -0.84 (0.47) (0.50) (9.28) 
Corporate Tax 0.10 0.26 -1.04 (0.30) (0.25) (6.09) 
Sales Tax 0.09 -0.07 2.68 (0.27) (0.19) (5.43) 
Property Tax -0.52 -0.24 5.89 (0.33) (0.18) (7.39) 
Disclosure -0.17 -0.28 -3.07 (0.32) (0.26) (5.33) 
Conservative Ideology 
(lag) 
-0.04 -1.91 -1.23 
(0.36) (1.77) (6.32) 
GSP per capita (log) -0.96 1.19 -18.32 (2.87) (3.21) (34.02) 
Unemployment rate -0.09 -0.05 1.59 (0.18) (0.13) (1.94) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.62 0.46 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%  Note: N=600. The dependent variable is the 
percent of total generation attributed to renewable energy sources (0-100). 
All specifications include state time trends and state and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state and region-year levels. 
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1.4.3 Types of renewable energy sources 
 
 The RPS mandates that a certain percentage share of electricity generation use renewable 
energy sources that are deemed eligible by the legislation. This gives utilities flexibility in the 
types of renewable energy sources they develop.24 With the rapid growth in wind over the past 
decade, it is commonly claimed that the RPS, in addition to federal policies and favorable market 
conditions, has had a significant influence on wind development (Wiser and Bollinger 2008). In 
this section I provide evidence in support of this claim. 
 I report in Table 1.6 the regression results from several estimations of the empirical 
model where the outcome variable is the share of total electricity generation from solar, 
geothermal, or wind. Comparing the estimated coefficients of the policy variable for all 
renewable energy sources and individual renewable energy sources reveals that the effect is 
primarily driven by wind. The share of all renewable generation is 0.72 percentage points higher 
in states with an RPS, while the share of wind is 0.40. This result is consistent with the rampant 
development of wind and it is surprising that electric utilities are relying on the cheapest 
renewable energy source to satisfy their mandates. I also estimate a positive though statistically 
insignificant effect for biomass and geothermal, and find no effect for solar.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 A number of policies have an explicit solar “carve-out” where a certain share must come from solar PV. However, 
these carve-outs typically come into effect around 2015. In 2009, only six states had a solar carve-out. The average 
carve-out for these six states was 0.03%. Excluding New Jersey who has the most aggressive solar carve-out, the 
average mandate for the five remaining states is 0.01%. 
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Table 1.6 Renewable energy sources 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All Biomass Geothermal Solar Wind 
RPS 0.75*** 0.26 0.07 -0.00 0.42** 
(0.24) (0.17) (0.07) (0.00) (0.17) 
Price of Electricity 
(Lag, Log) 
-1.59* 0.08 -0.17 -0.06 -1.44** 
(0.95) (0.68) (0.27) (0.05) (0.59) 
Deregulation -0.37 -0.56 0.08 0.01 0.10 
(0.76) (0.66) (0.06) (0.01) (0.23) 
Import ratio (lag) 0.87 1.49* 0.02 0.02 -0.66* 
(0.94) (0.80) (0.05) (0.02) (0.39) 
Percent of Other 
Generation (lag) 
-0.09*** -0.05* -0.00 -0.00 -0.03** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Interconnection 
Standard 
-0.30* -0.13* -0.05 0.00 -0.12 
(0.16) (0.08) (0.04) (0.00) (0.13) 
Public Benefits Fund 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.07 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.05) (0.01) (0.14) 
Green Power Program -0.19 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.17 
(0.47) (0.11) (0.03) (0.00) (0.48) 
Corporate Tax 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.06 
(0.30) (0.06) (0.03) (0.00) (0.30) 
Sales Tax 0.09 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.22 
(0.27) (0.09) (0.02) (0.00) (0.27) 
Property Tax -0.52 -0.17 0.05 -0.00 -0.40 
(0.33) (0.14) (0.05) (0.00) (0.28) 
Disclosure -0.17 0.24 -0.05 -0.02 -0.34 
(0.32) (0.21) (0.10) (0.01) (0.24) 
Conservative Ideology 
(lag) 
-0.04 -0.17 -0.10 -0.02 0.25 
(0.36) (0.22) (0.11) (0.01) (0.27) 
GSP per capita (log) -0.96 -2.13 0.62 -0.02 0.57 
(2.87) (1.43) (0.67) (0.03) (2.55) 
Unemployment rate -0.09 0.05 0.06* 0.01 -0.21 
(0.18) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.16) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.07 0.00 0.46 0.70 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%  Note: N=600. The dependent variable is the percent of total generation attributed to renewable 
energy sources (0-100). All specifications include state time trends and state and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state and region-year levels. 
 
   
 31 
1.5 Fossil fuel displacement result 
 
While the primary objective of an RPS policy is to increase renewable generation, there 
are numerous secondary objectives, such as economic benefits, energy security, and emissions 
reductions. Most of these benefits result from the displacement of fossil fuels. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the benefits will vary with the type of fossil fuel that is displaced. For example, coal 
results in significantly more emissions relative to natural gas, suggesting that the environmental 
benefits of an RPS policy will be considerably larger if coal is displaced relative to gas. Gaining 
a better understanding fossil fuel displacement will help inform policymakers of the potential to 
achieve the secondary objective of an RPS.  
 The first step in understanding fossil fuel displacement is to understand the electricity 
dispatch process. Electric grid system operators must continuously balance the quantity of 
electricity supplied and the quantity of electricity demanded. Constrained by existing electricity 
generating units (and transmission limits), grid system operators face a cost minimization 
problem. As a result, generating units with the lowest marginal cost of generation tend to operate 
at close to capacity at all times. Examples of these types of generating units are coal and nuclear 
power plants. To meet remaining demand, grid system operators continue dispatch generation 
beginning with generating unites with the next lowest marginal cost. Natural gas facilities tend to 
have a higher marginal cost relative to coal or nuclear and as a result are dispatched when the 
quantity of electricity demanded increases. Historically, most natural gas generating units used a 
combustion turbine and as a result could supply any level of generation at any time.  
 Renewable electricity sources are intermittent energy sources and as a result cannot be 
dispatched by the grid system operator. However, once the fixed costs of building a wind farm or 
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solar array are sunk, there are only maintenance and repair costs. When renewable generation 
occurs it shifts the short-run supply curve outward and because the demand for electricity is price 
inelastic in the short-run (most consumers face fixed prices), generation from dispatchable 
sources must decrease, beginning with the generating units with the highest marginal cost. If 
renewable generation occurs at night when the quantity of electricity demanded is low and only 
the lowest marginal cost units are operating, coal or nuclear will be displaced. If renewable 
generation occurs during the day when the quantity of electricity demanded is high, the higher 
marginal cost units, such as natural gas, will be displaced.  
 This suggests that determining which fossil fuel will be displaced is likely to vary with 
the existing generation mix as well as by the time of day when renewable generation occurs.  
There is an emerging literature that studies fuel displacement by estimating wind-induced 
reductions in emissions at the generator unit-level that provide empirical evidence to that effect 
(e.g. Novan 2011, Kaffine et al. 2010, Callaway and Fowlie 2009). Callaway and Fowlie (2009) 
and Novan (2011) find that emissions reductions vary depending on the time of day, and Kaffine 
et al. (2010) find that emissions reductions vary across the Texas, California, and Midwest 
electricity markets depending on the relative shares of coal and natural gas.  
In Table 1.7 I report results of the estimation of the empirical model where the dependent 
variable is the share of total generation using coal or natural gas. Given the intuition from the 
dispatch process and the recent empirical findings on fuel displacement, additional specifications 
include a control for coal and natural gas dependence, as well as the interaction term with the 
policy variable. I use total production within the state measured as a percentage of total US 
production to account for coal and natural gas dependence.25 When coal or natural gas 
                                                 
25 Coal production is measured in million short tons while natural gas production is measured in million cubic feet. 
These data are from the EIA.  
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production is interacted with the RPS policy variable, as in specifications (2) and (6), I estimate 
positive coefficients that are statistically insignificant. This is a somewhat surprising result as I 
would expect a displacement effect with increasing coal or natural gas production. As these 
estimates reflect the average displacement effect, they may not accurately reflect displacement 
for the highest producers of coal or natural gas.  
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Table 1.7 Fossil fuels 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Coal Natural Gas 
  Base Production 
Quartiles of 
Production 
Restricted 
Sample Base Production 
Quartiles of 
Production 
Restricted 
Sample 
RPS 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.20 -0.28 -0.29 -0.98 -1.17 (0.55) (0.68) (0.77) (0.76) (0.90) (0.94) (1.27) (1.51) 
RPS x % Coal 
Production  
0.02 
      
 
(0.30) 
      % Coal Production  
0.22 
      
 
(0.73) 
      RPS x % Natural Gas 
Production      
0.03 
  
     
(0.07) 
  % Natural Gas 
Production      
0.25** 
  
     
(0.11) 
  RPS x Quartile 2       
3.14* 3.45* 
      
(1.57) (1.86) 
RPS x Quartile 3   
-0.28 -2.50*** 
  
0.96 0.63 
  
(1.93) (0.82) 
  
(1.77) (1.87) 
RPS x Quartile 4   
0.62 0.47 
  
0.41 0.56 
    (1.24) (1.23)     (2.44) (2.61) 
Observations 600 600 600 564 600 600 600 564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  Note: The restricted sample excludes states 
with an RPS policy that was adopted before 2009 but the first incremental mandate is after 2009. In addition, these states showed little to no increase 
in renewable generation in the early years of adoption. Three states meet this criteria:  Michigan, Missouri, and North Carolina. The dependent 
variable is the percent of total generation attributed to coal or natural gas (0-100). All specifications include state time trends and state and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state and region-year levels.  
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To further study whether the RPS has resulted in fossil fuel displacement, and whether 
there is a heterogeneous effect for coal or natural gas, I interact the RPS policy variable with 
quartiles of coal or natural gas production. I exclude the first quartile so the coefficients on the 
second, third, and fourth can be interpreted relative to the first. I report these results in 
specifications (3) and (7). I find some evidence that coal is displaced in the third quartile of coal 
production relative to the first, but this differential effect is statistically insignificant.1 In regard 
to natural gas, the results reported in specification (7) show that the share of natural gas actually 
increases in states that are heavy producers of natural gas. The differential effect for the second 
quartile is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result is somewhat surprising. Natural 
gas production in both the first and second quartiles is zero or near zero so it may be the case that 
these states are investing in natural gas to manage the intermittent supply of electricity of 
renewable energy sources. 
There are eight states in my sample that had adopted an RPS by 2009, but the first RPS 
interim requirement was not until after 2009. The majority of these states exhibit growth in the 
share of renewable generation immediately following adoption suggesting investment in 
anticipation of the first interim requirement. Three states however, show little to no change. 
Without an increase in renewable generation, there can be no fossil fuel displacement. For 
example, Michigan experiences virtually no change in the share of renewable generation after 
adoption of the RPS policy, but experiences a 10% increase in the share of coal generation which 
may bias my estimates. In specifications (4) and (8) I test whether the previous results are 
sensitive to the inclusion of these three states. Excluding these states, I find strong evidence of a 
coal displacement when coal production is in the third quartile relative to the first. The 
differential effect is statistically insignificant for the fourth quartile relative to the first. These 
                                                 
1 There are no states with an RPS policy and coal production in the second quartile.  
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results provide some evidence in support of Kaffine et al. (2010) findings who find that coal 
displacement will occur in states where coal dominates the generation mix. The natural gas 
results are similar to the result with the full sample.  
 
1.6 Limitations 
 
The empirical methodology discussed so far assumes that all policies, including the RPS, 
are exogenous. This is a strong assumption which is unlikely to be true in practice. It is 
reasonable to assume that there are unobserved factors that not only influence the composition of 
the state’s energy portfolio, but are also correlated with the adoption of an RPS policy. The 
correlation between the unobserved variables and the RPS policy adoption, and the unobserved 
variables and renewable generation, are likely to be in in the same direction suggesting that my 
estimates are biased upward. While I have included state and year fixed effects, in addition to a 
number of covariates known to affect the adoption of the RPS policy (e.g. Lyon and Yin 2010, 
Chandler 2009), I acknowledge that endogeneity is still a concern in this research.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
Though the RPS policy is economically inefficient, the past decade has witnessed the 
proliferation of these policies at the state level. By 2012, over half of the states had adopted the 
RPS with an additional eight states having RPS goals. Furthermore, a national RPS has been 
debated by Congress on a number of occasions. As the impact of the RPS policy continues to 
manifest it is important to develop an understanding of existing experience to help inform the 
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national policy debate. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the existing literature and 
provide policymakers with additional insight into the RPS. In contrast to the previous literature, 
in this research I study the heterogeneous effects of the RPS policy. I not only consider factors 
that might influence the policy’s effectiveness, but also whether the RPS has a different effect on 
renewable and fossil fuel-based generation.  
My results show that while the stringency of the policy is an important factor in the 
impact of the policy on the share of renewables in the generation mix, market conditions also 
result in a heterogeneous effect of the RPS. Interestingly, I find that wind resource potential does 
not influence the effect of the RPS policy. In regard to the heterogeneous effects of RPS 
implementation on renewable generation, perhaps the most striking finding is that the change in 
the generation mix is attributed to IPPs who are not actually subject to the RPS mandate. Future 
studies on the RPS should be sure to consider the dynamics between firm types within the 
electric power industry to get a more accurate understanding of the policy. Studying the impact 
of the RPS by type of energy resource type is also important. With wind being the most cost 
competitive, it is important for future research to continue to analyze energy sources 
individually. Aggregating energy sources may be misleading. I also consider the displacement of 
fossil fuels and find evidence of a heterogeneous effect on coal and natural gas. While I find 
compelling evidence of coal displacement in states that produce a relatively large share of U.S. 
coal production, the results for natural gas are less clear with small natural gas producing states 
actually increasing the share of natural gas generation.   
As the impact of the RPS policy continues to manifest, academic researchers and 
policymakers alike should continue to work to gain a better understanding of the RPS and its 
influence on the energy portfolio. Studying the heterogeneous effects of this highly variable 
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state-level policy is critical to developing a clear understanding of the RPS. This knowledge 
should help to inform the policy debate at both the state and national level.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF  
REAL-TIME FEEDBACK ON DRIVING BEHAVIOR 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the United States the transportation sector is an important target group for emissions 
reductions. According to the Energy Information Administration, this sector has led in total 
carbon dioxide emissions for over one decade, and by 2010, one-third of all carbon dioxide 
emissions resulting from energy consumption were attributed to transportation. Vehicle 
emissions also contribute significantly to other air pollutants, including carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, precursors to ground-level ozone and the components of 
smog, as well as particulate matter and air toxins that are known human carcinogens, all causing 
a variety of health and environmental problems.2  
The potential for reducing vehicle emissions in the near-term with existing policy is fairly 
limited. Historically, the United States has relied on technology-based mandates, such as the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard, or more recently, alternative fuel mandates, such as 
the Renewable Fuels Standard, to address vehicle emissions. However, these types of policies 
can lead to perverse incentives resulting in an increase in emissions rather than a reduction (e.g. 
Holland et al. 2009, Parry et al. 2004). Additional policies promote the development of 
alternative vehicle technologies, such as hybrids and electric vehicles. However, given that 
vehicles are durable goods, a considerable amount of time would be required to convert the 
existing vehicle fleet into one that is less dependent on petroleum.  
                                                 
2 http://www.epa.gov/oms/invntory/overview/pollutants/index.htm  
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An alternative approach to reducing vehicle emissions targets the behavior rather than the 
technology. Economists have long argued for price-based policies, such as a gasoline tax, to 
influence driving behavior and, consequently, vehicle emissions. However, empirical research 
estimates a low price elasticity of demand for gasoline in the short-run suggesting that a large 
price increase would be required to reduce emissions in the near-term(e.g. Davis and Killian 
2009, Hughes et al. 2008, Austin 2008). Furthermore, the political will to adopt price-based 
policies in the United States is virtually nonexistent, particularly as the country recovers from an 
economic recession.  
Other transportation programs promote alternative transportation, such as public transit, 
carpooling, biking, and telecommuting. However, these programs have been largely ineffective 
except in areas with high population density (Barkenbus 2010). Research suggests that there is 
considerable psychological resistance against interventions aimed at reducing the number of 
vehicle-miles traveled (e.g. Tertoolen et al. 1997). This may be due to cultural and emotional 
attitudes towards driving, as well as the feeling that any individual effort to reduce vehicle 
emissions contributes so little that personal motivation is low (i.e. the public good problem).  
Given the dispersed urban development in the United States, technology mandates that 
are largely ineffective, and public resistance to alternative transportation, I consider a different 
approach for reducing vehicle emissions in the near-term. “Aggressive” driving, including 
speeding, sudden starts and stops, and excessive idling, can reduce fuel economy by anywhere 
from 10% to 20% (e.g. Stillwater et al. 2011).3 Encouraging drivers to adopt fuel-efficient 
driving behaviors could yield considerable reductions in vehicle emissions. However, there are 
currently no federal programs in the United States that promote eco-driving (Barkenbus 2010). 
                                                 
3 The Department of Energy suggests up to 33% of fuel consumption may be attributed to driving behavior, although 
this measure includes vehicle maintenance behaviors in addition to driving practices. 
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/driveHabits.shtml 
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This was not always the case. In the late 1970’s the Department of Energy established the Driver 
Energy Conservation Awareness Training (DECAT) program. This program offered training 
courses on eco-driving techniques, primarily targeting large fleets and motor pools (Barkenbus 
2010). However, in the late 1980’s this program was terminated due to public indifference as a 
result of low gasoline prices and a lack of political support by the Reagan administration 
(Barkenbus 2010).4 
In this paper I study whether an in-vehicle display providing real-time fuel economy 
information can effectively encourage fuel-efficient driving behavior, reducing fuel consumption 
and emissions. Recent academic work reveals that real-time information on energy consumption 
in the residential sector can lead to considerable reductions in residential energy consumption 
(e.g. Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2010). With an increasing number of new vehicle-models 
providing fuel economy displays, the question remains whether this type of real-time information 
has any influence on driving behavior. Using a randomized experiment I find that real-time 
feedback does influence driving behavior and improves fuel economy by an average of 5%.  
The benefits of promoting fuel-efficient driving are numerous. First, the savings are 
immediate and experienced by the entire vehicle fleet, including fuel-sippers and gas-guzzlers. 
Second, the savings accrue to both the individual, in the form of cost savings and increased 
personal safety, and to society at large, in the form of emissions reductions. Finally, policies or 
programs targeting behavior change are often low-cost and face fewer political and economic 
barriers to implementation.  
 
 
                                                 
4While the United States has abandoned eco-driving programs at the federal level, several European countries, 
Canada and Japan have incorporated them within their carbon emissions reduction strategies. In fact, European 
Union regulations require that eco-driving is taught in driver education classes across Europe (Barkenbus 2010).   
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2.2 Information as a strategy for behavior change 
 
People do not have a good understanding of how their behavior and energy use are 
related (e.g. Attari et al. 2010). One reason is that people do not consume energy directly, but 
rather engage in activities or behaviors that use energy. The time lag between when the behavior 
occurs and when information is received only exacerbates the general lack of understanding. It is 
not surprising that with imperfect information consumers make sub-optimal decisions. 
Economists have long touted that rational decision-making occurs at the margin. However, 
consumers do not receive information on their energy use on the margin. Real-time information 
on energy consumption (or price if it varies in real-time) would provide consumers with the 
information needed to move closer to their optimal outcome (or level of energy consumption).  
In the residential electricity sector there is a large literature advocating for real-time 
electricity pricing. In most electricity markets the price of electricity is fixed (in the short-run) 
providing no incentive to consumers to reduce demand when supply is constrained and 
production costs rise (Borenstein 2002). Electricity prices that reflect real-time supply constraints 
results in a more price-elastic demand, yielding efficiency gains in both the short and long-run 
(e.g. Holland and Mansur 2006, Borenstein 2005). However, in most situations consumers face 
fixed energy prices so that real-time information on price would not be useful. In these situations 
real-time information on consumption or accumulating costs could be used. In a recent meta-
review of research providing households with real-time information on electricity consumption, 
Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) find that real-time feedback results in average electricity savings 
of 9% to 12%. This suggests that real-time information on energy consumption alone can help 
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consumers to re-optimize. In this research I study whether real-time information on fuel 
economy has a comparable effect on energy consumption in the transportation sector.  
Academic research studying the effect real-time feedback on driving behavior is fairly 
limited. Most of the existing work relies on hypothetical scenarios rather than real-world driving 
behavior. For example, Jenness et al. (2009) hosted a focus group finding that participants with 
fuel economy displays self-reported engaging in less speeding, hard braking, and rapid 
acceleration. van der Voort et al. (2005) developed a fuel-efficiency support tool used in a 
driving simulation experiment. The tool monitors driver behavior and compares it to a normative 
model of optimal behavior, providing advice to the driver on a text screen display. A series of 
green, yellow and red lights highlight the deviation in the driver’s actual behavior to the optimal 
behavior. Results from the simulation revealed a 16% reduction in fuel consumption. The 
average decrease in fuel economy from real-time feedback in these types of studies is 
approximately 5-10% (Stillwater et al. 2011).  
The emerging experimental research which relies on real-world driving scenarios 
primarily use hybrid or plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, as these vehicles have existing in-vehicle 
fuel economy displays. For example, Stillwater et al. (2011) conduct a study of drivers using 
PHEVs finding that the majority of participants increased their fuel economy after receiving real-
time feedback. Interestingly, they find one group of participants whose fuel economy actually 
decreased in response to the real-time feedback.  
I was only able to identify one experimental study similar to this one which examines the 
effect of real-time feedback in a real-world setting (Boriboonsomsin et al. 2012). Similar to my 
study, Boriboonsomsin et al. (2012) use an after-market real-time fuel economy feedback device 
allowing for a more representative sample of vehicle types and drivers. Their study compares the 
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average fuel economy of 20 self-selected drivers with and without the real-time feedback. In 
addition to the real-time feedback participants were given an information fact-sheet on eco-
driving. As a result, Boriboonsomsin et al. (2012) identify the combined effect of real-time 
feedback and information. The device they used was equipped with a GPS allowing the authors 
to separately measure the effect of the feedback and information on city roads and highways. A 
mean comparison revealed that fuel economy increased by an average of 6% in the city and 1% 
on highways. My study contributes to the literature by implementing a larger-scale randomized 
experimental study where the experimental design isolates the effect of real-time feedback in a 
real-world setting.  
 
2.3 Experimental method 
 
This study took place in Boulder, Colorado during the fall of 2011. The experimental method 
employed is a randomized control trial. People that were randomly assigned to the treatment 
group received a real-time information display device called the ScanGaugee.  
 
2.3.1 ScanGaugee 
 
The ScanGaugee provides information on both instantaneous fuel economy and average 
fuel economy (refer to Figure 2.1). It is an after-market device which can be plugged into a 
vehicle’s on-board diagnostic II (OBD-II) port. All vehicles sold in the United States after 1995 
are required to have an OBD-II port. Using an after-market device allows me to test the effect of 
real-time feedback on a more representative sample of the population under real-world driving 
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conditions, improving the generalizability of the results. Unlike Boriboonsomsin et al. (2010), I 
did not provide information to participants in the treatment group regarding how driving 
behavior relates to fuel economy. In this study I am interested in whether the constant feedback 
alone leads to a change in driving behavior, in part because this more accurately represents the 
type of fuel economy feedback that is present in vehicles today.  
 
Figure 2.1 ScanGaugee 
 
 
2.3.2 Experimental design 
 
Participants for this study were recruited with the collaboration of several businesses in 
the Boulder area.5,6 Each of these businesses worked with me to advertise the study to their 
employees either via email, flyers, or ads in a newsletter. In an effort to reduce selection bias the 
study was advertised as a study on the driving costs and driving behaviors of Colorado residents. 
Participants were informed that the study was being conducted in an effort to design 
transportation programs that better serve the needs of the community.  
                                                 
5 The businesses were: Ricoh Production Print Solutions, Boulder County Parks and Open Space, Boulder County 
Sheriff’s Office, Boulder Community Hospital, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder Valley School District, 
Corden Pharma, and Cisco Systems.  
6 There may be concern that if co-workers discuss the study that the estimated treatment effect will be biased. To test 
for this potential bias I perform a robustness test excluding participants who reported discussing the study with co-
workers who were also participating. These results can be found in Appendix F. Surprisingly excluding “talkers” 
results in a slightly larger average treatment effect (5.30% compared with 5.12%).   
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People interested in participating in the study were asked to complete an on-line survey 
with questions about their vehicle, driving costs and habits, as well as individual and household 
characteristics. The survey responses were used to determine eligibility. To be eligible for the 
study the vehicle had to be a 1996 or newer model vehicle with a functioning OBD-II port and 
not already have a similar fuel economy display.7 Once eligibility was determined participants 
were randomly assigned into a treatment and control group. A total of 213 individuals were 
eligible to participate in the study.8 Of the 213, 107 were randomly assigned to the treatment 
group and 106 were randomly assigned to the control group.   
All participants received an email indicating that they were either eligible or ineligible to 
continue participating in the study. Participants in the treatment group were also told that they 
had been selected to receive an in-vehicle information display devices that could provide them 
with real-time information about their driving behaviors and fuel costs. Participants were asked 
to contact the researcher if they wanted to decline. Of the 107 randomly assigned to the treatment 
group, 8 declined. It is not clear why these participants declined as I did not collect this 
information. I did, however, compare participants in the treatment group that completed the 
study to those that declined the ScanGaugee across a broad range of characteristics including 
socioeconomic characteristics, vehicle characteristics, and driving habits. Relative to participants 
that accepted the ScanGaugee, the people that declined were younger and reported driving fewer 
days during the week and fewer miles during the weekend. 
The duration of the study was two weeks. Participants were asked to fill their tanks at the 
beginning of the study, one week later, and at the end of the study. Refer to Figure 2.2 for an 
illustration of the timeline of the experimental study. After each fill-up, participants completed 
                                                 
7 In addition, participants were asked that they be the only person to drive the vehicle for the duration of the study. If 
a participant reported being unable to fulfill this request they were considered ineligible for the study.  
8 An additional 74 people completed the survey but were considered ineligible. 
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an on-line survey recording their fill-up information: odometer reading, gallons pumped, price 
per gallon.9 The survey also included questions regarding the occurrence of unusual driving 
conditions (e.g. traffic due to an accident) or driving trips that were different from routine 
driving behavior (e.g. extra trip on highway to visit friends). Unusual driving events that affect 
average fuel economy could bias the estimated average treatment effects if not taken into 
account. For example, if a participant in the treatment group encountered heavy traffic during the 
treatment period, but this is not accounted for in the empirical model, I would underestimate the 
average treatment effect. 
 
Figure 2.2 Timeline of experimental study 
 
 
Participants in the treatment group met with researchers at the beginning of the second 
week for the ScanGaugee to be installed, and again at the end of the study to have the device 
uninstalled. Participants were informed that the ScanGaugee does not transmit or record data and 
that the device was strictly for their own information. A concern with experimental studies is that 
participants may alter their behavior simply because they know their behavior is being observed 
and not because of the actual treatment (i.e. the Hawthorne effect). In an effort to limit the 
                                                 
9 If a participant filled up their tank more than once they were asked to record the fill-up information from all 
additional fills as well.  
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Hawthorne effect I assure participants that the real-time information was not being transmitted or 
recorded. In addition, both the treatment and control groups record their fill-up information and 
as a result any change in behavior resulting from just tracking fuel economy will be accounted 
for in the empirical model.10  
 At the end of the study all participants completed a follow-up survey. Participants in the 
treatment group were asked additional questions regarding the ScanGaugee. Any participant that 
completed the study in full was entered into a lottery with the chance of winning one of twenty-
one prizes, a $20 gift card or the grand prize of $500.  
 
2.3.3 Attrition and unusable data 
 
There were two forms of attrition in this study, participants declining the ScanGaugee and 
participants choosing to discontinue their participation. As mentioned previously 8 participants 
in the treatment group declined the ScanGaugee. Attrition due to discontinuing participation was 
considerable with a total of 81 participants dropping out over the course of the study. In many 
cases I was unable to determine the cause for attrition but comparable attrition rates across 
treatment status suggests it is unrelated to the treatment.11 When it was possible to identify the 
cause it was often related to unexpected business or personal travel, or vehicle trouble.  
I compared participants that dropped out of the study to those that completed the study 
across several characteristics. Participants that dropped out of the study were significantly more 
                                                 
10 A related concern is whether the treatment group changes behavior as a result of the information being provided, 
or whether simply having a real-time fuel economy feedback device in the vehicle changes behavior. In other words, 
are the drivers actually learning how to change their driving behavior based on the information being provided, or is 
it simply the presence of the device which raises awareness and attention to driving behavior? I explore this further 
in section 2.8. 
11 Of the 81 individuals that did not complete the study in full, 38 had been randomly assigned to the treatment 
group while 43 had been randomly assigned to the control group.  
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likely to rent their homes and have children. They were also significantly more likely to drive a 
truck and reported driving more miles per year. Finally, they were less likely to track the miles 
they drive, their gasoline costs, or their fuel economy. These findings reveal that participants 
who remained in the study for the duration already had some interest in their driving habits and 
costs. If people interested in their driving habits respond to real-time feedback in a systematically 
different way, my estimates may be biased.12  
Participants self-reported their fill-up information using an on-line survey. As a result, 
there was data recording error making some data unusable. For example, an unreasonably large 
change in fuel economy suggests that additional fills took place but were not recorded. To 
identify outliers I regress fuel economy in week two on fuel economy in week one and exclude 
participants where the studentized residuals were greater than two (in absolute value). In total, 
data from 8 participants was considered unusable. After accounting for attrition and unusable 
data the study sample consists of 116 participants: 57 in the treatment group and 59 in the control 
group.  
 
2.4 Empirical strategy 
 
The empirical strategy estimates the average treatment effect of real-time feedback on fuel 
economy. In this section I provide evidence that the randomization is well-balanced followed by 
a description of the empirical model.   
 
                                                 
12 For example, if drivers interested in their driving habits are more responsive to real-time feedback, had the 
participants not dropped out, we might expect the treatment effect to be smaller. If, however, drivers interested in 
their driving habits are less responsive to real-time feedback, perhaps because they have already adopted eco-driving 
practices, we might expect a larger treatment effect if the participants that dropped out of the study remained in the 
study. I explore this further in section 2.6.2. 
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2.4.1 Outcome of the randomization 
 
While individuals were randomly assigned into treatment and control groups it is 
important to verify that the treatment status is uncorrelated with observable characteristics. In 
Table 2.1 I present the differences in the average fuel economy between the treatment and 
control groups during the baseline period (week one). Average fuel economy for participants in 
the treatment group is 25.22 miles per gallon and 23.99 miles per gallon for the control group. 
This difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 2.1 Difference in baseline fuel economy by treatment status 
 
Treatment (T) 
 
Control (C) 
 
Difference (T-C) 
Mean S. D. Obs. 
 
Mean S. D. Obs. 
 
Mean t-statistic 
25.22 7.47 57 
 
23.99 6.62 59 
 
1.24 0.94 
 
Based on survey data, in Table 2.2 I present the differences in means across treatment 
status for a variety of socioeconomic characteristics, vehicle characteristics, and driving habits. 
The outcome of the randomization appears to be well-balanced. The treatment group has more 
participants who reported an annual income of less than $100,000 and more participants with a 
college degree. In addition, the treatment group drives vehicles that are significantly older. The 
average vehicle age for participants in the treatment group is approximately 9 years while the 
average vehicle age for participants in the control group is approximately 6 years. The over-
representation of older vehicles in the treatment group may result in a biased estimate of the 
treatment effect if drivers of older cars respond differently to real-time feedback in a systematic 
way (or if the ability to influence fuel economy through eco-driving varies with the age of the 
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vehicle). The empirical model presented next addresses this potential bias with the inclusion of 
individual fixed effects, however I explore the possibility of a heterogeneous effect of real-time 
feedback on fuel economy with vehicle age in section 2.6.1.  
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Table 2.2 Difference in baseline means of individual variables by treatment status 
 
 
Treatment (T) 
 
Control (C) 
 
Difference (T-C) 
             Mean S.D. N   Mean  S.D. N   Mean t-statistic 
           Socioeconomic Characteristics 
              Age (years) 43.45 11.46 55 
 
45.37 10.52 59 
 
-1.92 -0.93 
    Male (=1) 0.42 0.50 57 
 
0.41 0.50 59 
 
0.01 0.15 
    White (=1) 0.75 0.43 57 
 
0.80 0.41 59 
 
-0.04 -0.54 
    Married (=1) 0.65 0.48 57 
 
0.73 0.45 59 
 
-0.08 -0.92 
    Children (=1) 0.55 0.50 56 
 
0.66 0.48 59 
 
-0.11 -1.18 
    Owns house (=1) 0.81 0.40 57 
 
0.86 0.35 59 
 
-0.06 -0.83 
    College education (=1) 0.77 0.42 57 
 
0.88 0.33 59 
 
-0.11 -1.56 
    Income (=1 if <$100,000) 0.64 0.48 53 
 
0.50 0.51 50 
 
0.14 1.45 
    Environmental attitudes (15-75 scale) 47.95 4.80 56 
 
48.80 4.80 56 
 
-0.86 -0.95 
           Vehicle Characteristics 
              Age of vehicle 8.74 3.78 57 
 
6.10 3.86 59 
 
2.64 3.71 
    Car (=1) 0.67 0.48 57 
 
0.54 0.50 59 
 
0.12 1.37 
    Average fuel economy (self-reported) 25.21 6.84 56 
 
24.83 6.91 58 
 
0.38 0.30 
           Driving Behavior 
              Miles driven/week (=1 if <80 miles) 0.32 0.47 57 
 
0.29 0.46 58 
 
0.02 0.26 
    Miles driven to work (=1 if <20  
          miles) 0.70 0.46 57 
 
0.59 0.50 59 
 
0.11 1.22 
    Miles driven/wknd (=1 if <30 miles) 0.49 0.50 57 
 
0.49 0.50 59 
 
0.00 0.00 
    Miles driven per year 12168 6394 56 
 
12840 5181 58 
 
-671 -0.62 
    Track gasoline costs (=1) 0.57 0.50 56 
 
0.62 0.49 58 
 
-0.05 -0.53 
    Track miles driven (=1) 0.45 0.50 56 
 
0.49 0.50 57 
 
-0.04 -0.47 
    Track fuel economy (=1) 0.56 0.50 55 
 
0.53 0.50 58 
 
0.03 0.31 
    Gasoline expenses/month (=1 if         
          <$100) 0.30 0.46 57 
 
0.32 0.47 59 
 
-0.02 -0.27 
    Leadfoot (=1) 0.40 0.49 57 
 
0.42 0.50 59 
 
-0.02 -0.22 
    Regularly speed (=1) 0.63 0.49 57 
 
0.59 0.50 59 
 
0.04 0.42 
    Jackrabbit starts/stops (=1) 0.12 0.33 57 
 
0.17 0.38 59 
 
-0.05 -0.71 
    Improving fuel economy is important  
          (=1) 0.61 0.49 57 
 
0.56 0.50 59 
 
0.05 0.59 
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2.4.2 Empirical specification 
 
The objective of this research is to quantify the average treatment effect of real-time 
feedback on fuel economy, where the average treatment effect is 𝐸�𝑌𝑖,𝑡(1) − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡(0)�. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡(1) and 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡(0) denote the potential outcomes of individual i’s fuel economy in period t if the individual 
received the treatment or did not receive the treatment. While we can never observe both 
potential outcomes, randomization allows the identification of the average difference between 
these outcomes because the unobservable factors that influence fuel economy �𝜖𝑖,𝑡� are 
uncorrelated with the treatment. 
The primary specification uses a differences-in-differences estimator that models log fuel 
economy (𝑌𝑖,𝑡) conditional on individual-specific fixed effects (𝛼𝑖), a treatment group indicator (𝑇𝑖,), an indicator for the treatment period (𝑃𝑡), and covariates (𝑋𝑖,𝑡). I estimate the model using 
least squares where the standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity. The parameter of interest is 
𝛽2 which estimates the average treatment effect of real-time feedback on fuel economy. This 
effect is identified by the randomized design. 
                                           𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖) + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                 (2.1) 
 
Including individual-specific fixed effects accounts for time-invariant omitted variables. 
Examples might include the vehicle type, age, income, or environmental attitudes. These 
characteristics do not vary over the duration of my study but are likely to influence fuel 
economy. While it is not necessary to include covariates in the regression for a consistent 
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estimate of the average treatment effect, including them should reduce the standard error of the 
treatment effect as long as the covariates have explanatory power. I include the following 
covariates: the price of gasoline (logged) and unusual driving events. The variable driving event 
is constructed as a binary variable equal to one if the participant reported an unusual driving 
event, and zero otherwise.  
 
2.5 The effect of real-time feedback on driving behavior  
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the change in average fuel economy between week one and week 
two by treatment status providing descriptive evidence of a positive treatment effect. In 
particular, the increase in fuel economy between week one and week two is larger for the 
treatment group relative to the control group. It should also be noted that fuel economy during 
the baseline period is larger for the treatment group relative to the control group with may raise 
concern of selection into treatment. However, as shown in Table 2.1, this difference is 
statistically insignificant and furthermore there was no selection into treatment as treatment was 
randomly assigned.   
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Figure 2.3 Change in fuel economy by treatment status 
 
Note: Vertical dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval.  
 
To identify estimate the average treatment effect I estimate the model specified in 
equation (2.1). I report these regression results in Table 2.3. The results show that real-time 
feedback can yield an average increase in fuel economy of 5.2%, significant at the 5% level. 
These results provide statistical evidence in support of the hypothesis that real-time feedback 
influences driving behavior and increases fuel economy. 
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Table 2.3 Average treatment effect 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  DiD/FE LDV Normalized 
Treatment Group x Week 2 0.052** 0.051*** 0.051** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Week 2 0.01  
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Baseline Fuel Economy  
0.93*** 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
Driving event (=1) -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Price of gasoline (Log) 0.05 0.11 0.05 
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) 
Constant 2.65*** 0.09 0.95*** 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Observations 232 116 232 
Adjusted R-squared 0.94 0.88 0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% Note: N=57 in the treatment group, N=59 in the 
control group. The dependent variable is fuel economy (log).  
To test the robustness of this result, in specification (2) I report the regression results 
where I use an alternative estimation strategy: the lagged dependent variable (LDV) model. The 
LDV model uses the lagged dependent variable as a covariate, rather than fixed effects, to 
account for pre-treatment trends. Individual-specific fixed effects do not account for time-
varying omitted variables. For example, aggressive driving is known to reduce fuel economy. 
Including fuel economy during the baseline period as a covariate would implicitly control for 
aggressive driving behavior. The benefit of estimating both the differences-in-differences (or 
fixed effects) and LDV model is that the estimates provide a lower and upper bound of the causal 
treatment effect. As outlined by Angrist and Pischke (2009), this bracketing property arises from 
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the fact that if the true model is a fixed effects (FE) model but is estimated using a LDV, 
estimates of the treatment effect will be biased, where the direction of the bias is determined by 
the relationship between the treatment and the lagged dependent variable. Alternatively, if the 
true model is a LDV model but is estimated using a FE model, estimates of the treatment effect 
will be biased in the other direction. With a positive relationship between treatment and the 
lagged dependent variable, the LDV model will provide the lower bound while the FE model 
will provide the upper bound. The results of the estimations of the LDV model reveal an average 
treatment effect of 5.1%, significant at the 1% level.  
While the LDV model provides a lower bound, I use the FE model for the remainder of 
the paper. The advantage of a LDV model is that including the lagged dependent variable 
controls for time-varying omitted variables. However, with only two periods, the identification 
strategy relies on the assumption week one’s fuel economy will control for omitted variables that 
influence fuel economy in week two. However, there may be omitted variables that are not 
reflected in baseline fuel economy but are important to control for when estimating the effect of 
real-time feedback on fuel economy in week two. For example, a person with strong 
environmental attitudes but is uninformed about eco-driving practices may have a different 
response to real-time feedback compared to a person with weaker environmental preferences. It 
is not clear that fuel economy in the baseline period would control for these differences. From 
this standpoint I believe the FE model is better suited for this research.13  
In specification (3) I construct the dependent variable as the normalized change in fuel 
economy to test whether using the log construct results in a biased estimate of the average 
                                                 
13 With more time periods, a lagged dependent variable model may be more attractive as it would capture pre-
treatment trends and thus time-varying omitted variables. 
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treatment effect.14 While both the log and normalized dependent variables can be interpreted as a 
percentage change, the log specification reflects the average of the percent reductions, while 
using the normalized change reflects the average reduction measured as a percent of the baseline 
(Allcott 2010). If the treatment effect is larger for drivers with high fuel economy, taking the log 
and then taking the average will understate the average treatment effect relative to taking the 
average change in levels and normalizing into a percent. Alternatively, if the treatment effect is 
smaller for drivers with high fuel economy, the log specification will overstate the average 
treatment effect. The results in specification (3) show that in my case, the latter is true; the 
average treatment effect in the log specification is 5.2% whereas the average treatment effect 
when using the normalized dependent variable is 5.1%.15 While this difference is small, I use the 
normalized dependent variable (multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation) for the remainder of 
the paper so as not to overstate the treatment effect when using the fixed effect model which 
already reflects the upper bound.   
In this section I have shown that the average treatment effect is approximately 5%, and 
that this result is robust to different estimation strategies and different constructs of the 
dependent variable. But, what does this 5% reduction really mean? Average fuel economy during 
the baseline period was reported as 25 miles per gallon. This means a 5% increase in average 
fuel economy will increase fuel economy to 26.25 miles per gallon. The average number of miles 
driven per year was reported as 12,510 miles. As a result, real-time feedback reduces fuel 
consumption by an average of approximately 24 gallons per year or $84, assuming a cost of 
$3.50 per gallon of gasoline. Translating these savings into emissions reductions, one gallon of 
                                                 
14 To normalize the dependent variable I take the change in fuel economy between week two and week one and 
normalize it by dividing by baseline fuel economy for individual i. 
15 In section 2.6.1 I show that the conditional treatment effect for drivers of vehicles in the highest fuel economy 
quartile is approximately zero. 
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gasoline releases twenty pounds of carbon dioxide when burned. 16 This means, real-time 
feedback reduces carbon dioxide emissions by 480 pounds per person per year. While these 
savings may seem small at the individual-level, they are considerable when aggregated across the 
vehicle fleet. If just 1,000 people purchase real-time feedback displays, carbon emissions would 
decrease by an average of 480,000 pounds. That is equivalent to taking nearly 42 passenger 
vehicles off the road every year.17   
Research suggests that up to 20% of fuel consumption can be attributed to driving 
behavior depending on the duration of the study (e.g. Stillwater et al. 2011). Larger effects are 
often identified for very short-term studies (e.g. a few hours or a few days) while smaller effects 
are identified for longer duration studies (e.g. weeks or months) (Stillwater et al. 2011). My 
estimate of an average treatment effect of 5% is in line with the previous literature. The 
contribution of this research is that it adds validity by using a randomized experimental design in 
a real-world setting. Future research should continue to develop an understanding of how best to 
provide information to motivate larger changes in driving behavior that persist.  
 
2.6 Heterogeneous treatment effects 
 
In section 2.5 I estimated the average treatment effect, but the treatment effect may vary 
with characteristics of the vehicle or driver. In this section I explore whether the treatment effect 
is different depending on baseline fuel economy and the age of the vehicle. I also consider 
heterogeneity based on a variety of other vehicle and driver characteristics, such as vehicle type 
and the environmental attitudes of the driver. I am unable to estimate the heterogeneous 
                                                 
16 http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/co2.shtml  
17 http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/f00013.htm  
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treatment effects with statistical significance due to the small sample sizes. I present these results 
to discuss their economic significance.  
 
2.6.1 Fuel economy and vehicle age 
 
While I have shown that real-time feedback has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on fuel economy, this treatment effect may vary with baseline fuel economy in a 
systematic way. For example, drivers of fuel-efficient vehicles may have an underlying concern 
for fuel efficiency and may have already adopted eco-driving behaviors. As a result, these drivers 
may experience no change in fuel economy in response to the real-time feedback. To study 
whether the treatment effect varies with baseline fuel economy I construct a dummy variable for 
each quartile of fuel economy reported in week one. The variables for the second, third, and 
fourth quartiles are interacted with the treatment effect and can be interpreted as the differential 
effect relative to quartile one. I report the results of this regression in Table 2.4, specification (1).  
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Table 2.4 Quartile analysis: Fuel economy and vehicle age 
 
 
(1) (2) 
  Baseline MPG Vehicle Age 
Treatment Group x Week 2 x Quartile 2 0.15 7.44 
(5.45) (5.03) 
Treatment Group x Week 2  x Quartile 3 2.16 -1.22 
(5.16) (5.07) 
Treatment Group x Week 2  x Quartile 4 -5.55 5.04 
(5.93) (6.46) 
Treatment Group x Week 2 5.96 1.24 
(3.86) (3.54) 
Week 2 x Quartile 2 -3.31 -0.37 
(3.86) (3.34) 
Week 2 x Quartile 3 -7.88** 4.65 
(3.30) (3.37) 
Week 2 x Quartile 4 -0.53 1.24 
(4.32) (4.97) 
Week 2 4.48* 0.77 
(2.68) (2.18) 
Driving event (=1) -0.53 0.09 
(1.93) (1.96) 
Price of gasoline (Log) 2.56 3.77 
(19.45) (25.24) 
Constant 101.03*** 97.48*** 
(24.18) (31.03) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% Note: N=232 (57 in the treatment group, 59 in the control group). All specifications include 
individual fixed effects. MPG quartiles are: 11-19, 19-24, 24-30, 30-51 miles per gallon. Vehicle 
age quartiles are: 0-4, 5-8, 9-11, 12-15 years.  
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The results show a larger treatment effect for drivers of vehicles with mid-range fuel 
economy relative to drivers of fuel-inefficient vehicles. The differential effect is largest for 
vehicles with fuel economy in the third quartile (24-30 miles per gallon). It is somewhat 
unfortunate that the results suggest that real-time feedback is not more effective for drivers of the 
most fuel-inefficient vehicles. Larrick and Soll (2008) reveal that equal improvements in fuel 
economy yield much larger reductions in fuel consumption for vehicles with low fuel economy 
compared to vehicles with mid- to high-fuel economy performance. 18 This is known as the 
“MPG illusion” and suggests that real-time feedback would be most effective at reducing fuel 
consumption, and consequently emissions, if it motivated drivers of fuel-inefficient vehicles to 
change their driving behavior. An active area of current research explores ways of presenting 
information via real-time displays so that it is appealing and effective for different target 
audiences (e.g. Stillwater and Kurani 2011). For example, it may be that presenting real-time fuel 
cost information, rather than real-time fuel economy information, would be more effective for 
drivers of fuel-inefficient vehicles. 
My results also show that drivers of the most fuel-efficient vehicles are the least 
responsive, with the conditional treatment effect nearing zero. As discussed in the previous 
section, it is likely this near zero treatment effect that results in the log specification overstating 
the average treatment effect relative to the normalized specification. It may be that these drivers 
are already fuel-economy conscious and engage in eco-driving practices. As a result, the real-
time feedback may not have provided them with new information to learn from. Alternatively, 
drivers of highly fuel-efficient vehicles may have been less responsive because they already 
                                                 
18 For example, assuming that a person drives their vehicle 10,000 miles, improving fuel economy from 12 mpg to 
15 mpg saves 167 gallons of fuel while an improvement from 32 mpg to 35 mpg will save only 27 gallons of fuel.  
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drive a fuel-efficient vehicle and so may be less concerned with further improvements to fuel 
economy.  
I next study whether the treatment effect varies with the age of the vehicle. Knittel and 
Sandler (2011) find that the demand for gasoline of drivers of older vehicles is relatively more 
price elastic. Based on this we might hypothesize that drivers of older vehicles will be more 
responsive to the real-time feedback. Because my study sample is restricted to vehicles that are a 
1996 or newer model, I may underestimate the effect of real-time feedback for the general 
population if the treatment effect is larger for drivers of older vehicles.  
In Table 2.4, specification (2) I present results where I estimate the conditional average 
treatment effects for vehicle-age quartiles. Similar to the fuel economy quartile analysis, I create 
a dummy variable for each quartile of vehicle age. The second, third, and fourth quartile 
variables are interacted with the treatment effect to estimate the differential treatment effect 
conditional on vehicle-age. The quartiles represent vehicles from the following years: the first 
quartile are 2007-2011 models, the second quartile are 2003-2006 models, the third quartile are 
2000-2002 models, and the fourth quartile are 1996-1999 models. I find that while the treatment 
effect is substantially larger for the oldest vehicles (5 percentage points higher) the differential 
effect is even bigger for vehicles in the second age-quartile (7.44 percentage points). 
Interestingly, the differential effect is negative for vehicle models from 2000-2002 compared to 
the newest vehicles from years 2007-2011 with a conditional treatment effect near zero. These 
results suggest that vehicle age does not seem to influence the treatment effect in any systematic 
way.  
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2.6.2 Other characteristics of the vehicle and driver 
 
There are other characteristics of the vehicle or driver that are of interest. In Tables 2.5-
2.7 I consider whether the treatment effect varies based on the following characteristics: vehicle-
type (car, manual transmission), driving behavior (heavy driver, aggressive driver), and driver 
characteristics (environmental attitudes, track fuel economy, belief that improving fuel economy 
is important).19 I find that the treatment effect is larger for cars relative to trucks, and for vehicles 
with a manual transmission relative to an automatic transmission. However, these heterogeneous 
effects are relatively small, around 1 percentage point.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 A heavy driver is a driver that reported driving more than the average of 12,500 miles per year. An aggressive 
driver is a driver who reported having a “lead-foot” and regularly making hard starts and stops. A driver with strong 
environmental attitudes is a driver who scored higher than the average score of 48 on the New Environmental 
Paradigm scale (Dunlap et al. 2000). Fuel economy is considered important if the driver ranked it as a 4 or 5 out of a 
6-point scale (0-5).  
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 Table 2.5 Vehicle characteristics 
 
    (1) (2) 
Treatment Group x Week 2 x Car  
1.03 
 
 
(3.98) 
 Week 2 x Car  
-1.24 
 
 
(2.69) 
 
Treatment Group x Week 2 x Manual   
0.84 
  
(4.41) 
Week 2 x Manual   
3.67 
  
(3.15) 
Treatment Group x Week 2  
4.61 4.62** 
 
(3.12) (2.32) 
Week 2  
2.15 0.35 
 
(2.01) (1.53) 
Driving event (=1)  
-0.43 -0.09 
 
(1.85) (1.83) 
Price of gasoline (Log)  
5.64 6.95 
 
(22.82) (25.67) 
Constant  
95.13*** 91.98*** 
 
(28.04) (31.53) 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.07 0.10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% Note:  N=232 (57 in the treatment group, 59 in the control group). All 
specifications include individual fixed effects.  
I also find that real-time feedback is more effective for heavy drivers relative to light 
drivers. Specifically, real-time feedback increases fuel economy by 4.79 percentage points more 
for heavy drivers relative to light drivers. At first this finding was surprising as I expected heavy 
drivers to be more familiar with eco-driving practices and as a result hypothesized a negative 
differential effect. However, the positive sign of the estimated coefficient may be due to the fact 
that heavy drivers reported driving significantly more miles each week compared with light 
drivers. Each additional mile driven provides more time to learn from the real-time feedback and 
adapt driving behavior. Real-time feedback is also more effective at improving fuel economy for 
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aggressive drivers relative to passive drivers. This is not too surprising as aggressive driving 
behaviors are very fuel inefficient.  
 
Table 2.6 Driving style 
  (1) (2) 
Treatment Group x Week 2 x Heavy Driver 4.79  (3.90) 
 Week 2 x Heavy Driver -6.35**  (2.67) 
 Treatment Group x Week 2 x Aggressive Driver  
1.22 
 
(3.96) 
Week 2 x Aggressive Driver  
-2.01 
 
(2.76) 
Treatment Group x Week 2 2.54 4.43* (2.92) (2.65) 
Week 2 4.38** 2.45 (2.05) (1.72) 
Driving event (=1) 0.48 -0.20 (1.83) (1.87) 
Price of gasoline (Log) 12.51 3.28 (23.86) (23.91) 
Constant 85.02*** 98.24*** (29.30) (29.39) 
Observations 228 232 
    Treatment 56 57 
    Control 58 59 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% Note:  All specifications include individual fixed effects.  
In Table 2.7 I show that real-time feedback is more effective for drivers with strong 
environmental attitudes and who have a high awareness of fuel economy. The treatment effect is 
4.80 percentage points higher for drivers with strong environmental attitudes, 1.17 percentage 
points higher for drivers who reported regularly tracking their fuel economy, and 2.95 percentage 
points higher for drivers who rated fuel economy as important. These results suggest that real-
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time feedback may be most effective for drivers who are already fuel-economy conscious.20 This 
is consistent with Stillwater et al. (2011) who find the larges reductions in fuel use (4%) was by 
drivers who cared the most about gas and financial savings. These are important findings 
because to achieve significant reductions in vehicle emissions, real-time feedback needs to not 
only engage drivers that are already interested in improving their fuel economy (or reducing gas 
consumption and costs), but also attract new interest. As mentioned previously, an active area of 
research is studying ways to engage different target audiences with driver feedback (e.g. 
Stillwater and Kurani 2011). This is an important area of research particularly as new vehicle 
models continue to provide feedback displays. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 This finding also suggests that my results may over-estimate the treatment effect for the general population (i.e. 
positive selection bias) if those who signed up to participate in the study have stronger environmental attitudes 
and/or are fuel economy-conscious.  
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Table 2.7 Environmental attitudes and awareness of fuel economy 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment Group x Week 2 x Strong Env. Att.  4.80   (3.85) 
  
Week 2 x Strong Env. Att. 0.25   (2.69) 
  
Treatment Group x Week 2 x Track FE  
1.17 
 
 
(4.10) 
 
Week 2 x Track FE  
-2.14 
 
 
(2.74) 
 
Treatment Group x Week 2 x FE Importance   
2.95 
  
(4.02) 
Week 2 x FE Importance   
-3.42 
  
(2.70) 
Treatment Group x Week 2 2.85 4.63 3.51 
(2.59) (3.37) (3.09) 
Week 2 1.35 2.63 3.37* 
(1.84) (2.31) (1.97) 
Driving event (=1) -0.67 -0.51 -0.43 
(1.83) (1.83) (1.83) 
Price of gasoline (Log) 5.73 5.87 4.07 
(23.49) (22.31) (21.20) 
Constant 94.67*** 95.06*** 97.52*** 
(28.74) (27.38) (26.13) 
Observations 232 226 232 
    Treatment 57 55 57 
    Control 59 58 59 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects.  
 
2.7 Learning from real-time feedback 
 
 The previous sections have established that real-time fuel economy feedback changes 
driving behavior. But the question remains as to whether the change in behavior is due to the 
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actual information being provided or whether it is the Hawthorne effect. It is possible that the 
presence of the real-time feedback device brought awareness and attention to driving behaviors, 
but that changes in driving behavior are not actually attributed to the information being provided. 
To explore this in more detail I make use of survey responses to the follow-up survey which 
asked participants in the treatment group to rate how much attention they paid to the 
ScanGaugee, and to identify which metric(s) they paid attention to (the ScanGaugee provides 
both average fuel economy and instantaneous fuel economy metrics).  
In Table 2.8 I report results where the treatment group is restricted to participants who 
reported paying a high level of attention, and whether the participant paid attention to the 
average fuel economy metric, the instantaneous fuel economy metric, or both.21 The results show 
that the average treatment effect is larger for participants who reported paying a high level of 
attention to the ScanGaugee. In addition, I show that the average treatment effect varies 
depending on which metric the participant paid attention to. In particular, the treatment effect is 
largest for participants who reported paying attention to only the average fuel economy metric.22 
The finding of heterogeneous treatment effects based on metric suggests that the information 
provided by the ScanGaugee is the underlying cause for the change in behavior and not simply 
the presence of the device. This supports the hypothesis that drivers are learning from the real-
time feedback and changing their behavior in response to the information being provided.  
                                                 
21 Attention was ranked on a 6-point scale. High levels of attention were considered a 4 or 5. 
22 Ito (2010) finds that households respond to average electricity prices rather than marginal electricity prices 
potentially due to the cognitive cost associated with responding to marginal prices. My results show that drivers 
respond to changes in average fuel economy rather than the marginal changes. This suggests that the cognitive cost 
of learning from the instantaneous fuel economy metric may be a limiting factor. In fact, one participant noted in the 
follow-up survey, “the instant number was too hard to follow; the average number was easy to understand.” An 
important area of future research should explore what type of information is most effective at changing behavior.  
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Table 2.8 Learning from real-time feedback 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All 
High Level 
of Attention 
SGE Metric: 
AVG 
SGE Metric: 
MPG 
SGE Metric: 
AVG and MPG 
Treatment Group x Week 2 5.12** 5.53** 6.47** 3.17 4.82 
(2.02) (2.24) (2.85) (3.77) (2.92) 
Week 2 1.46 1.40 1.39 1.24 1.32 
(1.37) (1.38) (1.39) (1.40) (1.40) 
Driving event (=1) -0.33 -0.51 0.14 0.06 -1.59 
(1.85) (2.10) (2.32) (2.43) (2.38) 
Price of gasoline (Log) 5.29 -0.18 2.28 -9.01 -11.84 
(23.36) (23.04) (25.01) (22.57) (20.61) 
Constant 95.27*** 101.98*** 98.98*** 112.82*** 116.23*** 
(28.59) (28.22) (30.63) (27.67) (25.27) 
Observations 232 212 162 142 154 
    Treatment 57 47 22 12 18 
    Control 59 59 59 59 59 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  Note: All specifications include 
individual fixed effects. Each specification limits participants in the treatment group to those that match the criteria specified. For 
example, in specification (2) the treatment group consists of participants who reported paying a high level of attention to the ScanGaugee.  
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2.8 A change in attitudes 
 
In addition to changes in driving behavior I am also interested in whether real-time 
feedback led to a change in attitudes with respect to modifying driving habits. People do not 
often identify eco-driving practices when considering ways to improve their fuel economy. I was 
curious whether having the real-time feedback changed the way people think about their driving 
habits and driving costs, at least in the short-term. In the follow-up survey participants in both 
the treatment and control group described ways that they might change their driving habits. The 
responses fell into one of the following three categories: use alternative transportation (e.g. bus, 
carpool), reduce the number of vehicle-miles-traveled (e.g. through combining errands), or adopt 
eco-driving practices. Table 2.9 presents the percentage of responses in each category.1 
Comparing responses suggests that the real-time feedback does make drivers more aware of the 
relationship between their driving behavior and their fuel use. Eco-driving was the most common 
response in the treatment group over alternative transportation and reducing vehicle-miles 
traveled. In addition, compared to the control group where only 14% identified eco-driving as a 
way to reduce driving costs, 67% of participants in the treatment group identified eco-driving 
practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Percentages do not total 100% as one response can be assigned to more than one category. For example, a response 
stating that the person wants to take the bus more and combine errands is included in both the alternative 
transportation category and the reducing vehicle-miles traveled category.  
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Table 2.9 A change in attitudes by category 
 
 
Treatment Group Control Group 
Difference  
(T-C) 
Alternative Transportation 38% 50% -12% 
Reduce Vehicle-Miles-Traveled 14% 54% -40% 
Eco-Driving Practices 67% 14% 53% 
 
2.9 External validity 
 
For any experimental study it is important to address whether the results are 
generalizable. While the study sample is not a representative sample, in Table 2.10 I summarize 
the profile of the study sample compared to a representative sample of drivers from the U.S. 
population as reported by the National Highway Transportation Survey (2009). The vehicle 
profile of the study sample includes more cars with an average age of 2 years less than the NHTS 
sample. Relative to the NHTS sample of drivers, the study sample also includes more females 
below the age of 55, who have a college education, own their homes, and have an income of over 
$100,000.  In Appendix G I present results where I estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects 
for these characteristics. Most notably I find the treatment effect is 5.22 percentage points larger 
for individuals with an annual income of less than $100,000. Given that the study sample has a 
higher average income than the NHTS sample, the treatment effect for a more representative 
sample may be larger than the effect estimated for the study sample. I also find the treatment 
effect is smaller for people under the age of 55 and for people without a college degree. My 
sample has more participants that are under the age of 55 and with a college degree compared to 
the NHTS sample, suggesting again that the treatment effect may be larger in a more 
representative sample.  
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Table 2.10 Difference in NHTS sample and study sample 
 
    NHTS   Study Sample 
Socioeconomic Characteristics 
        Age (<55 years) 
 
63% 
 
78% 
    Male 
 
60% 
 
41% 
    White 
 
77% 
 
78% 
    Owns house 
 
75% 
 
84% 
    College education 
 
35% 
 
48% 
    Employed 
 
99% 
 
100% 
    Income (<$100k) 
 
83% 
 
57% 
     Vehicle Characteristics 
        Age of vehicle (years) 
 
9 
 
7 
    Car 
 
50% 
 
60% 
     Driving Behavior 
        Distance of Commute (miles) 
 
12.1 
 
10-19 
    Miles per year 
 
12,888 
 
12,510 
 
 
2.10 Discussion 
 
Real-time information displays are already available in hybrid-electric vehicles and some 
gasoline-engine vehicles. However, these vehicles represent only a small fraction of the current 
vehicle population in the United States. Several aftermarket devices are available which can 
provide instantaneous fuel economy readings, such as the ScanGaugee used in this experiment. 
These devices allow a much larger fraction of the vehicle population to receive real-time 
information on fuel economy. Furthermore, experience indicates that drivers welcome feedback 
devices in their vehicles (Barkenbus 2010).  
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In this study I provide evidence that real-time feedback is effective at changing driving 
behavior. Using a randomized experiment I find that real-time feedback increases fuel economy 
by an average of 5%. While this effect may seem small at the individual-level, the reduction in 
fuel consumption and emissions are significant when aggregated across the entire vehicle fleet. I 
find evidence suggesting that drivers of vehicles with mid-range fuel economy are more 
responsive to the real-time feedback. Future research should explore how to motivate drivers of 
fuel-inefficient vehicles to adopt eco-driving practices as even small improvements would yield 
large reductions in fuel consumption and vehicle emissions. I also find that drivers with strong 
environmental attitudes who are fuel-economy conscious are also more responsive to real-time 
feedback. Empirical research should continue to explore heterogeneity in the response to real-
time feedback so that the feedback can be tailored to increase effectiveness.  
While real-time feedback eliminates some of the informational barriers to the relationship 
between driving behavior and fuel economy, strong emotional and cultural barriers to eco-
driving remain (Barkenbus 2010). In the United States cars are more than a means of 
transportation; they are a symbol of freedom and are prized for capabilities that result in greater 
vehicle emissions (e.g. horsepower). Furthermore, driving behavior is generally performed out of 
habit. While this study confirms that real-time feedback brings attention to driving habits in the 
short-term, it is not clear whether these effects will persist. Persistence remains one of the largest 
gaps in the literature on real-time feedback, in both the residential and transportation sectors. A 
likely outcome is that people will stop paying attention to the feedback and revert back to their 
original driving behaviors. However, if drivers adopt new habits, the changes may not only 
persist over time, but also be carried over to other vehicles (Kurani 2007). If shown to persist, 
real-time feedback presents an opportunity to effectively reduce vehicle emissions in both the 
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near and long-term. Furthermore, compared to alternative transportation policies, real-time 
feedback can be provided at relatively low cost and does not face the same political and 
economic barriers to implementation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
CAN SOCIAL NORMS BE LEVERAGED TO CHANGE DRIVING BEHAVIOR? 
A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the United States the transportation sector constitutes an important target group for 
emissions reductions. It has been the leading sector in total carbon dioxide emissions for the past 
decade and contributes significantly to a variety of other air pollutants. As discussed in Chapter 
2, existing policies offer little potential for reducing near-term vehicle emissions. Spurred by the 
need to reduce near-term emissions there has been a growing interest in using motivational 
techniques informed by the behavioral sciences to reduce energy consumption. One of the most 
notable techniques provides information on the social norm. This approach is based on the 
finding that an individual’s behavior is heavily influenced by the actions and/or beliefs of their 
peers. Academic researchers and practitioners alike have consistently revealed that social norms 
influence behavior across a variety of domains.2  
In recent years social norms have been applied to the residential energy sector revealing 
that social norms can also influence energy consumption (e.g. Allcott 2011, Cost and Kahn 2010, 
Ayers et al. 2009, Nolan et al. 2008), as well as the adoption of energy efficient and renewable 
energy technologies (e.g. Herberich et al. 2011, Bollinger and Gillingham 2010). Perhaps the 
most well-known application of social norms in the energy sector is an energy conservation 
program developed by the company, O Power. O Power provides Home Energy Reports which 
                                                 
2 For example, social norms have been shown to influence behaviors as diverse as voter turn-out (Gerber and Rogers 
2009), tax compliance (Wenzel 2005), charitable contributions (e.g. Shang and Croson 2008, Frey and Meier 2004), 
retirement savings (Beshears et al. 2009), theft (Cialdini et al. 2006), littering (Cialdini et al. 1990), hotel towel 
reuse rates (Goldstein et al. 2008), and water conservation (Ferraro and Price 2010). 
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compare the household’s energy use to that of similar nearby neighbors. Allcott (2011) performs 
an extensive evaluation of the program with a randomized experimental design and estimates an 
average treatment effect of 2%.  
In this paper I consider whether social norms can be applied to the transportation sector, 
and in particular, driving behavior. While social norms have been used to influence driving 
behaviors, such as drunk driving (e.g. Perkins et al. 2010) or the use of seatbelts (e.g. Stasson 
and Fishbein 1990), to my knowledge, there has been no research into whether social norms can 
be leveraged to encourage fuel-efficient driving. In this paper, similar to the program developed 
by O Power, I provide drivers with information on how their own fuel economy compares to that 
of a driver with the same vehicle. I use a small randomized experiment as the basis for this 
exploratory study. I find evidence suggesting that social norms can influence driving behavior 
and, once some key challenges have been addressed, I believe this technique could be an 
effective way for reducing vehicle emissions in the near-term.  
 
3.2 Social norms as a strategy for behavior change 
 
To conceptualize how social norms influence behavior consider an informal model in 
which consumers receive consumption utility from an energy service, in this case driving. The 
consumer can invest in “energy efficiency” for some cost such that the consumer achieves the 
same level of utility but with lower energy input (Davis 2008). For this study I consider “energy 
efficiency” the adoption of fuel-efficient driving practices, but it could also be the purchase of a 
more fuel-efficient vehicle. In addition to consumption utility, consumers receive moral utility 
which reflects the moral cost or benefit associated with the action (Levitt and List 2007). In this 
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case, there is a moral cost associated with driving as it contributes to a public bad (i.e. 
emissions).3 In this framework there are at least two ways in which social norms can influence 
behavior. First, investing in “energy efficiency” produces a direct decrease in moral costs. 
Second, learning about the social norm provides a previously unknown reference point and could 
facilitate social learning, allowing consumers to optimize on their energy use. Based on this 
informal model, I would expect that a person who learns that their fuel economy is lower than 
the average fuel economy of their peers will adopt more fuel-efficient driving practices.  
 
3.3 Experimental method 
 
This study took place at six educational institutions across the Denver-metro area of 
Colorado during the fall of 2011.4 The experimental method I employ is a randomized control 
trial. Participants that were randomly assigned to the treatment group received information on the 
social norm. 
 
3.3.1 Social normative information 
 
Participants in the treatment group received two email messages providing a social 
comparison of the participant’s fuel economy to the average and maximum fuel economy of 
other drivers with the same year, make, and model vehicle.5 The information used to make the 
                                                 
3 The moral payoff will depend upon both the salience and strength of the social norm surrounding the action, as 
well as the extent to which the action is observed. 
4 The educational institutions were: the University of Colorado Boulder, Red Rocks Community College, 
Community College of Aurora, Community College of Denver, Arapahoe Community College, and Front Range 
Community College. 
5 While a comparison based on the same year, make, and model vehicle provides a more relevant comparison, the 
differential between an individual’s fuel economy and the peer average may be small reducing the strength of the 
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comparison was collected from a website hosted by the Department of Energy where drivers 
across the United States report their fuel economy.6 However, participants were informed that 
the comparison was based on other students attending their educational institution. Research in 
social psychology finds that social comparisons are more effective when it is based on a group 
that the person identifies with (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2008). The second email message also 
provided a historic comparison in addition to the social comparison, and both email messages 
provided tips on fuel-efficient driving practices.  
The theory of social norms suggests that once informed of the norm, people modify their 
behavior so that it is in accordance with that norm. In this case, people who learn their fuel 
economy is below average would take action to improve their fuel economy, moving them closer 
to the norm. However, an unintended consequence of social normative information is that people 
who learn their fuel economy is above average may actually change their driving habits to 
decrease their fuel economy. This is referred to in the literature as the “boomerang effect”. 
Schultz et al. (2007), for example, find that households who learn they consume less energy than 
their neighbors actually increased their energy use. To counteract the boomerang effect social 
psychologists propose including a message highlighting that above-average performance is 
socially desirable (this is referred to as an injunctive norm in this literature).7 Research has 
shown that including an injunctive norm does eliminate the boomerang effect (Cialdini et al. 
1990). I employ two methods to prevent a boomerang effect. First, I include statements 
                                                                                                                                                             
comparison. Faced with a trade-off between relevance and strength I opted for providing a relevant comparison. The 
literature suggests that social norms are more effective when the comparison is based on a group that the person 
identifies with (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2008). In addition, people have a tendency to justify the difference in their 
behavior relative to the norm. Providing the average for the same vehicle reduces the potential justifications for a 
differential in fuel economy. Even still, in the follow-up survey some participants identified other features of the 
vehicle, such as tire size, as a justification.  
6 http://www.fueleconomy.gov  
7 For example, O Power includes smiley faces in their Home Energy Reports when households use less energy than 
their neighbors.  
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encouraging the above-average performance and appeal to the financial savings of continued 
fuel-efficient driving, a likely motivator for college students. Second, the social comparison is 
made not only with respect to the peer average but also to the peer maximum. Refer to Figures 
3.1 and 3.2 for a sample of the email messages. 
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Figure 3.1 First email message 
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Figure 3.2 Second email message 
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3.3.2 Experimental design 
 
Participants for this study were recruited from six educational institutions in the Denver-
metro area. The study was advertised through email, posters and newspapers. In an effort to 
reduce selection bias, the study was advertised as a study on the driving costs and driving 
behaviors of college students in the Denver-metro area. Students were informed that the study 
was being conducted in an effort to design transportation programs that better serve the needs of 
the student community.  
Students that were interested in participating were asked to sign up for the study through 
an on-line survey. The survey highlighted the eligibility requirements, including that the student 
be at least 18 years of age and have a valid driver’s license.8 Eligible students were then mailed 
informed consent forms, and once signed and returned, were asked to complete an on-line survey 
including questions about their vehicle, driving costs and habits, as well as individual and 
household characteristics. All students that completed the survey were randomly assigned into a 
treatment and control group.  
The duration of the study was three weeks. Participants were asked to fill their tanks at 
the beginning of the study, one and two weeks later, and at the end of the study. Refer to Figure 
3.3 for an illustration of the timeline of the experimental study. After each fill-up participants 
completed an on-line survey recording their fill-up information: odometer reading, gallons 
pumped, and price per gallon.9 The survey also included questions regarding the occurrence of 
any unusual driving conditions (e.g. traffic due to an accident) or driving trips that were different 
                                                 
8 Students were also asked that they be the only person to drive the vehicle for the duration of the study. If this was 
found to present a problem the student was no longer eligible to participate.  
9 If a participant filled up their tank more than once they were asked to record the fill-up information from all 
additional fills as well.  
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from routine driving (e.g. extra trip on highway to visit friends). Unusual driving events that 
affect average fuel economy could bias the treatment effect if not taken into account. For 
example, if a participant in the treatment group encountered heavy traffic, but this is not 
accounted for in the empirical model, I may underestimate the average treatment effect. In the 
middle of the second and third weeks participants in the treatment group received the email 
message containing the social normative information and fuel-efficient driving tips.  
 
Figure 3.3 Timeline of experimental study 
 
At the end of the study all participants completed a follow-up survey. Participants in the 
treatment group were asked additional questions about the content of the email messages. Any 
participant that completed the study in full was entered into a lottery with the chance of winning 
one of twenty-one prizes, a $20 gift card or the grand prize of $500.  
 
3.3.3 Snow 
 
At the beginning of the third week of the study there was a snowstorm in Colorado which 
left snow on the roads for a few days. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
reported approximately 7 inches of snowfall in Boulder and approximately 4 inches of snow fall 
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in Denver. 10 Ideally I would be able to account for the number of driving trips made in the snow, 
distances driven, types of roads, etc. as all of these factors will affect average fuel economy. 
However, because participants did not complete a driving log for each driving trip, I am only 
able to determine whether the participant drove in the snowy conditions or not. I include this 
measure as a covariate in the empirical model.  
 
3.3.4 Attrition and unusable data 
 
The primary form of attrition in this study was the result of students discontinuing 
participation prior to completion of the study. A total of 348 students signed up for the study, but 
only 90 completed the survey providing background information. Another 30 students dropped 
out before completing the first survey recording their fill-up information. I compared these 30 
students to the students that remained in the study along several dimensions, including 
socioeconomic characteristics, vehicle characteristics, and self-reported driving behaviors. I did 
not find any significant differences. Only 1 additional student dropped out after the first fill. I 
was unable to determine the reason.  
Participants self-reported their fill-up information using an on-line survey. As a result, 
there was data recording error making some data unusable. For example, an unreasonably large 
change in fuel economy suggests that additional fills took place but were not recorded. To 
identify outliers I regress fuel economy in week three on fuel economy in weeks one and two and 
exclude participants where the studentized residuals were greater than two (in absolute value). In 
total, data from 9 participants was considered unusable. After accounting for attrition and 
                                                 
10http://www.nohrsc.noaa.gov/nearest/     
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unusable data the study sample consists of 50 participants: 23 in the treatment group and 27 in 
the control group.  
 
3.4 Empirical strategy 
 
The empirical strategy estimates the average treatment effect of the social normative 
information and fuel-efficient driving tips on fuel economy. In this section I provide evidence on 
the randomization and discuss the empirical strategy.  
 
3.4.1 Outcome of randomization 
  
While individuals were randomly assigned into treatment and control groups, it is 
important to verify that the treatment status is uncorrelated with observable characteristics and 
that there is no selection bias. In Table 3.1 I present the differences in baseline average fuel 
economy between the treatment and control groups. Average fuel economy for the treatment 
group is 21.01 miles per gallon, and 20.91 miles per gallon for the control group. This difference 
is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 3.1 Difference in baseline fuel economy by treatment status 
 
 
Treatment (T) Control (C) Difference (T-C) 
  Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean t-statistic 
         MPG 21.01 6.23 23 20.91 6.94 27 0.10 0.05 
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Based on survey data, in Table 3.2 I present the differences in means across treatment 
status for a variety of socioeconomic characteristics, vehicle characteristics, and self-reported 
driving habits. I find that more participants in the control group are married. In addition, I find 
that more participants in the treatment group reported regularly tracking their fuel economy. 
There may be concern that the average treatment effect will be biased if drivers who regularly 
track their fuel economy respond to the social normative information in a systematically different 
way. While this may be a concern, the empirical model presented next addresses this potential 
bias with the inclusion of individual-specific fixed effects.  
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Table 2. Difference in baseline means of individual variables by treatment status 
 
Treatment (T) 
 
Control (C) 
 
Difference (T-C) 
    Mean S.D. N   Mean S.D. N   Mean t-statistic 
Socioeconomic Characteristics 
              Age (years) 30.48 11.33 23 
 
32.26 9.58 27 
 
-1.78 -0.60 
    Male (=1) 0.30 0.47 23 
 
0.41 0.50 27 
 
-0.10 -0.75 
    White (=1) 0.78 0.42 23 
 
0.81 0.40 27 
 
-0.03 -0.28 
    Married (=1) 0.30 0.47 23 
 
0.52 0.51 27 
 
-0.21 -1.53 
    Children (=1) 0.35 0.49 23 
 
0.41 0.50 27 
 
-0.06 -0.42 
    College education (=1) 0.48 0.51 23 
 
0.44 0.51 27 
 
0.03 0.23 
    Attends community college (=1) 0.61 0.50 23 
 
0.67 0.48 27 
 
-0.06 -0.42 
    Employed (=1) 0.74 0.45 23 
 
0.67 0.48 27 
 
0.07 0.55 
    Income (=1 <$20,000) 0.61 0.50 23 
 
0.44 0.51 27 
 
0.16 1.15 
    Environmental attitudes (15-75 scale) 49.52 3.85 23 
 
48.81 3.97 26 
 
0.71 0.64 
           Vehicle Characteristics 
              Age of vehicle 9.04 5.44 23 
 
10.11 5.13 27 
 
-1.07 -0.71 
    Car (=1) 0.61 0.50 23 
 
0.67 0.48 27 
 
-0.06 -0.42 
    Average fuel economy (self-reported) 23.17 4.74 23 
 
22.57 5.75 27 
 
0.60 0.40 
           Driving Behavior 
              Miles driven/week (=1 if <80 miles) 0.39 0.50 23 
 
0.37 0.49 27 
 
0.02 0.15 
    Miles driven to work (=1 if <20  
          miles) 0.85 0.37 20 
 
0.84 0.37 25 
 
0.01 0.09 
    Miles driven to school (=1 if <20      
          miles) 0.86 0.35 22 
 
0.84 0.37 25 
 
0.02 0.22 
    Miles driven/wknd (=1 if <30 miles) 0.57 0.51 23 
 
0.59 0.50 27 
 
-0.03 -0.19 
    Miles driven per year 10000 4912 21 
 
11831 5002 25 
 
-1831 -1.25 
    Track gasoline costs (=1) 0.52 0.51 23 
 
0.46 0.51 26 
 
0.06 0.41 
    Track miles driven (=1) 0.48 0.51 23 
 
0.46 0.51 26 
 
0.02 0.11 
    Track fuel economy (=1) 0.83 0.39 23 
 
0.50 0.51 26 
 
0.33 2.49 
    Gasoline expenses/month (=1 if  
          <$100) 0.35 0.49 23 
 
0.42 0.50 26 
 
-0.08 -0.53 
    Leadfoot (=1) 0.43 0.51 23 
 
0.52 0.51 27 
 
-0.08 -0.58 
    Regularly speed (=1) 0.52 0.51 23 
 
0.70 0.47 27 
 
-0.18 -1.32 
    Jackrabbit starts/stops (=1) 0.09 0.29 23 
 
0.15 0.36 27 
 
-0.06 -0.65 
    Improving fuel economy is important  
          (=1) 0.74 0.45 23 
 
0.63 0.49 27 
 
0.11 0.82 
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3.4.2 Empirical specification 
 
The objective of this research is to quantify the average treatment effect of the treatment 
messages on fuel economy, where the average treatment effect is 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) − 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0)]. 𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) and 
𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) denote the potential outcomes of individual i’s fuel economy in period t if the individual 
received the treatment or did not receive the treatment. While we can never observe both 
potential outcomes, randomization allows the identification of the average difference between 
these outcomes, as the unobservable factors that influence fuel economy �𝜖𝑖,𝑡� are uncorrelated 
with the treatment.  
The primary specification uses a fixed effects estimator that models log fuel economy (𝑌𝑖,𝑡) conditional on individual-specific fixed effects (𝛼𝑖), time period fixed effects (𝛾𝑡), a 
treatment group variable (𝐷𝑖,𝑡,), and covariates (𝑋𝑖,𝑡). The treatment group variable is equal to 
one for participants in the treatment group during the treatment period (week 3), and zero 
otherwise.11 While it is not necessary to include covariates in the regression for a consistent 
estimate of the average treatment effect, including them should reduce the standard error of the 
treatment effect as long as the covariates have explanatory power. I include the following 
covariates: the price of gasoline (logged), snow driving, and unusual driving events. The 
variables snow driving and driving event are constructed as binary variables equal to one if the 
participant reported driving in snow or an unusual driving event, and zero otherwise.  
                                           𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                 (3.1) 
                                                 
11 In order to provide the social normative comparison, participants needed to complete the online fill-up survey so I 
could calculate fuel economy and compare it to the “peer” average and maximum. However, participants did not 
complete the surveys promptly and as a result the first treatment message was emailed midway through week two, 
just prior to a weekend. Because of this I expect the first message to have had minimal influence on week two’s fuel 
economy and treat week two as a control period. 
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I estimate the model using least squares where the standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity. 
The parameter of interest is 𝛽 which estimates the average treatment effect of social norms on 
fuel economy. This effect is identified by the randomized design. 
 
3.5 The effect of social norms on driving behavior 
  
In Table 3.3 I present the regression results from estimating the fixed effects (FE) model 
specified in equation (3.1). The results show an average treatment effect of 1%. Due to the small 
sample size I am unable to estimate the treatment effect with statistical significant, however the 
positive coefficient suggests that social norms may be effective at changing driving behavior, 
and consequently, increase average fuel economy.  
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Table 3.3 Average treatment effect 
 
 
(1) (2) 
  FE LDV 
Treatment Group x Week 3 0.010 0.054 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Lagged Fuel Economy (Log)  
0.88*** 
 
(0.08) 
Week 3 0.01 -0.08 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Week 2 0.07**  (0.03) 
 
Price of Fuel (Log) 0.35** 0.32*** 
(0.17) (0.11) 
Driving Event -0.03 -0.06 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Drive in Snow 0.00 -0.07 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 2.57*** 0.05 
(0.20) (0.31) 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes No 
Observations 153 102 
    Treatment 24 24 
    Control 27 27 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.73 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: The 
dependent variable is fuel economy (log).  
 
As a robustness test I also estimate a logged dependent variable (LDV) model. While the 
identification strategy for the FE estimator relies on time-invariant omitted variables, it may be 
the case that there are omitted variables that are time-varying. The LDV model uses the lagged 
dependent variable as a covariate, rather than fixed effects, to account for pre-treatment trends. 
For example, aggressive driving is known to reduce fuel economy. Including fuel economy 
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during the baseline period as a covariate would implicitly control for aggressive driving 
behavior. The benefit of estimating both a FE and LDV model is that the estimates provide a 
lower and upper bound of the causal treatment effect. As outlined by Angrist and Pischke (2009), 
this bracketing property arises from the fact that if the true model is a FE model but is estimated 
using a LDV, estimates of the treatment effect will be biased, where the direction of the bias is 
determined by the relationship between the treatment and the lagged dependent variable. 
Alternatively, if the true model is a LDV model but is estimated using a FE model, estimates of 
the treatment effect will be biased in the other direction. I estimate the relationship between the 
treatment and the lagged dependent variable and find a negative relationship. This suggests that 
the FE model will provide a lower bound, while the LDV model will provide the upper bound. I 
present results of the LDV model in Table 3.3, specification (2) and estimate an average 
treatment effect of 5.4%. These results suggest that social norms influence fuel economy by an 
average of approximately 1%-5%. Given this relatively wide range, I use the FE model for the 
remainder of the paper as it provides the lower bound of the average treatment effect.  
 
3.5.1 Peer comparison 
 
In this study, the social normative comparison received by participants in the treatment 
group can be classified in one of three ways: below the peer average, above the peer average but 
below the peer maximum, or above the peer maximum. Refer to Figure 3.4 for an illustration.   
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Figure 3.4 Fuel economy peer comparison 
 
 
To gain a better understanding of the way in which social norms influence behavior, in this 
section I explore whether the treatment effect varies depending on which type of message was 
received. In Table 3.4 I present regression results where I study each of these categories 
separately. To isolate the behavioral response to the social normative comparison, I only 
consider participants who performed consistently within each of these groups. While this reduces 
my sample size it provides for a more straightforward analysis. To accurately identify the effect 
of the social normative comparison it is essential to compare participants in the treatment group 
within each of these categories to participants in the control group within each of these 
categories. While participants in the control group did not receive the social normative 
comparison I identify whether they would have been classified as consistently performing below 
the peer average, above the peer average but below the maximum, and above the peer maximum.  
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Table 3.4 Peer comparison 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All 
Below 
Average 
Above Average, 
Below 
Maximum 
Above 
Maximum 
Treatment Group x Week 3  0.010 0.085 0.044 0.148 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
Week 3 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) 
Week 2 0.07** 0.04 0.01 0.03 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Price of Fuel (Log) 0.35** 0.71** -1.14 0.42** 
(0.17) (0.26) (0.87) (0.14) 
Driving Event -0.03 0.01 -0.06 - 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) - 
Drive in Snow 0.00 0.09 -0.16** -0.08 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
Constant 
2.57*** 2.09*** 4.65*** 2.61*** 
(0.20) (0.34) (1.09) (0.18) 
Observations 153 66 24 15 
    Treatment 24 10 5 1 
    Control 27 12 3 4 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.92 0.94 0.90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: The dependent variable is fuel economy (log). All specifications include individual fixed effects.  
 
The results in Table 3.4 show that the average treatment effect for participants who 
consistently performed below the peer average is larger compared to participants who performed 
in the middle (above average but below maximum). This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
people who perform below the norm modify behavior to move closer to the norm. The positive 
coefficient for those who performed above average but below the maximum suggests that 
providing an injunctive norm was effective at eliminating the boomerang effect. Interestingly the 
largest treatment effect is for those who performed consistently above average. However, with 
   
 95 
this effect being identified off only one person in the treatment group I cannot address how the 
treatment effect might vary for those who consistently performed above the maximum.12  
 
3.6 Heterogeneous treatment effects 
 
The analysis in section 3.5 estimated the average treatment effect, but the treatment effect 
may vary with vehicle or driver characteristics. Empirical research on the effect of social norms 
on residential energy consumption has identified heterogeneity in the treatment effect. For 
example, Allcott (2011) finds that O Power’s neighbor comparison is most effective at reducing 
household energy consumption for those households that consume the most (6.3%) and least 
effective for those that consume the least (0.3%). Costa and Kahn (2010) also show 
heterogeneity in the treatment effect based on environmental ideology. In particular, they find 
that O Power’s neighbor comparison actually increases energy consumption by 1% in 
conservative households, but decreases energy consumption by 3% in liberal households. 
Following this literature, I explore whether there is evidence of heterogeneity in the treatment 
effect based on baseline fuel economy and the environmental attitudes of the driver. In 
considering whether social norms can be an effective approach for reducing vehicle emissions, it 
is important to understand whether they influence everyone’s behavior or whether they are only 
effective for a particular segment of the population.  
To study whether the treatment effect varies with fuel economy I create a dummy 
variable equal to one if fuel economy is in the upper median. In Table 3.5 I present regression 
results where the median dummy variable is interacted with the treatment effect and time period 
                                                 
12 I tested whether the differential effects were statistically significant and found that they were not. These results are 
presented in Appendix H.  
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fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on the treatment effect interaction can be interpreted as 
the differential in the treatment effect for vehicles in the upper median of fuel economy relative 
to vehicles in the lower median. The results show a positive effect for the upper median. This 
result suggests that drivers of vehicles with a fuel economy range of greater than 22 miles per 
gallon were more responsive to the social normative comparison relative to drivers with vehicles 
with a fuel economy range of less than 22 miles per gallon. This is somewhat surprising as we 
might expect drivers with fuel inefficient vehicles to be motivated to adopt eco-driving practices 
to save fuel and money. However, drivers of high fuel economy vehicles may be more aware of 
their fuel economy and as a result are more responsive. With more data it would be interesting to 
see whether treatment effects increase consistently with fuel economy, or whether the trend is 
non-linear.  
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Table 3.5 Fuel economy  
 
 
(1) (2) 
  
Base 
Model 
Median 
MPG 
Treatment Group x Week 3 x Upper Median  
0.115 
 
(0.08) 
Week 3 x Upper Median  
-0.20*** 
 
(0.07) 
Week 2 x Upper Median  
-0.18*** 
 
(0.05) 
Treatment Group x Week 3  0.010 -0.04 
(0.05) (0.07) 
Week 3 0.01 0.11 
(0.05) (0.07) 
Week 2 0.07** 0.15*** 
(0.03) (0.05) 
Price of Fuel (Log) 0.35** 0.37*** 
(0.17) (0.11) 
Driving Event -0.03 -0.04 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Drive in Snow 0.00 -0.01 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 
2.32*** 2.25*** 
(0.24) (0.18) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% Note: N=153. There are 24 participants in the treatment group and 27 in 
the control group. The dependent variable is fuel economy (log). All specifications include 
individual fixed effects. The upper median of baseline fuel economy is greater than 22 
miles per gallon.  
I next study whether environmental attitudes and attention to fuel economy result in 
heterogeneous treatment effects. To measure environmental attitudes I consider participants who 
scored higher than the average score of 48 on the New Ecological Paradigm scale (Dunlap et al. 
2000). The NEP scale relies on a set of fifteen questions to rate an individual’s environmental 
ideology. Higher scores correspond with stronger environmental attitudes. The measure for 
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attention to fuel economy is a dummy variable equal to one if the participant reported regularly 
tracking their fuel economy, and zero otherwise. It may be the case that individuals who are 
already attentive to their fuel economy will find the social comparison more or less motivating. 
To estimate the differential effects these variables are interacted with the treatment effect and 
time period fixed effects. I report the regression results in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6 Environmental attitudes 
 
 
(1) (2) 
  
Environmental 
Attitudes 
Fuel 
Economy 
Conscious 
Treatment Group x Week 3 x Strong Env Attitudes -0.01  (0.11) 
 
Week 3 x Strong Env Attitudes 0.09  (0.08) 
 
Week 2 x Strong Env Attitudes 0.07  (0.05) 
 
Treatment Group x Week 3 x Track Fuel Economy  
0.10 
 
(0.12) 
Week 3 x Track Fuel Economy  
-0.05 
 
(0.08) 
Week 2 x Track Fuel Economy  
0.01 
 
(0.06) 
Treatment Group x Week 3  0.02 -0.06 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Week 3 -0.05 0.03 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Week 2 0.02 0.07 
(0.04) (0.05) 
Price of Fuel (Log) 0.34* 0.82*** 
(0.18) (0.26) 
Driving Event -0.03 -0.03 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Drive in Snow -0.00 0.03 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 2.31*** 1.71*** 
(0.26) (0.35) 
Observations 153 150 
    Treatment 24 24 
    Control 27 26 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.84 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: The dependent variable is fuel economy (log). All specifications include individual fixed effects.  
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Surprisingly, the results show that the differential effect for environmental attitudes is negative, 
though the effect size is small (-0.01%). The differential effect is positive for individuals who 
report regularly tracking their fuel economy relative to those that do not. This result is important 
as it suggests that social norms are most effective for those already interested and engaged. To 
reduce emissions on a large-scale, a social norm-based strategy should motivate changes in 
everyone’s behavior. This is an area of research that is gaining more attention as behavior-based 
programs are becoming more prevalent. As of yet, there is no consensus regarding whether these 
types of programs result in heterogeneous changes in behavior based on specific individual 
characteristics.  
 
3.7 Discussion 
 
With limited opportunity for reducing energy-related emissions in the near-term, 
researchers and practitioners alike have been evaluating behavioral approaches to reduce energy 
consumption. However, little work has been done in the transportation sector. For this paper I 
designed and implemented a small randomized experiment to consider whether the well-
established technique of social norms can be applied to the transportation sector, encouraging 
fuel-efficient driving practices. While the small sample sizes do not allow me to identify the 
treatment effects with statistical significance, the results do suggest of a positive treatment effect.  
Through this exploratory study I have identified a few key challenges associated with 
using social norms in the transportation sector. First, careful attention must be paid to the 
message provided. For example, including a maximum comparison proved important in 
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motivating behavior change for those already performing above the peer average. In addition, 
identifying an injunctive norm that effectively counteracts the boomerang effect is critical.  
Second, not only must the message be carefully crafted, but the social comparison must 
be relevant. While the comparison used in this study was based on others driving the same year, 
make, and model vehicle, there are many other features that affect fuel economy and should be 
considered. For example, one participant commented that they did not specify tire size and so the 
comparison may not be relevant. As another example, one participant commented that they only 
drive city streets and expected that others do more highway driving. As a result, this participant 
attributed their performance relative to their peers as out of their control.  These are certainly 
valid points and if social norms are to be used effectively in transportation it will be important to 
account for additional features of the vehicle, as well as the proportions of city versus highway 
driving. 
Finally, more experimental research is needed to address questions surrounding 
heterogeneity, and more importantly, persistence. There are strong emotional and cultural 
barriers associated with driving. In the United States, cars are more than a means of 
transportation; they are a symbol of freedom and are prized for capabilities that often times 
results in greater vehicle emissions (e.g. horsepower). It is not clear whether social norms result 
in a short-term change in behavior, or whether new driving habits are formed which will persist.  
I believe a large-scale program could be designed that leverages social norms to 
encourage fuel-efficient driving. While there are some challenges associated with using social 
norms, with additional research and careful program design these challenges can be addressed. 
For example, technologies currently exist which track and transmit data on fuel economy and 
driving conditions (e.g. DashCommand). This type of device would allow for unobtrusive data 
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collection and a more accurate social comparison between vehicles and drivers. A program could 
synthesize this data to provide drivers with a social comparison via the computer, mobile 
application, or even an in-vehicle display. According to Spinak et al. (2008), Nissans sold in 
Japan already use this type of approach providing a fuel economy ranking based on drivers with 
the same vehicle as part of its in-vehicle navigation system.  
There are numerous benefits to a program design that effectively leverages social norms 
to encourage fuel-efficient driving. Not only do savings accrue to both the individual, in the form 
of cost savings, but also to society at large, in the form of emissions reduction. Perhaps more 
importantly, using motivational techniques informed by the behavioral sciences are often low-
cost, and face fewer political and economic barriers to implementation. If effective, these 
approaches could provide a means for reducing vehicle emissions in the near-term.  
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Appendix A 
 
  (1) (2) 
RPS 0.75*** 0.46 
(0.24) (0.29) 
Price of Electricity (Lag, Log) -1.59* -1.56 
(0.95) (1.07) 
Deregulation -0.37 -0.03 
(0.76) (0.49) 
Import ratio (lag) 0.87 0.53 
(0.94) (0.75) 
Percent of Other Generation (lag) -0.09*** -0.07** 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Interconnection Standard -0.30* -0.06 
(0.16) (0.20) 
Public Benefits Fund 0.21 -0.53 
(0.17) (0.32) 
Green Power Program -0.19 1.05** 
(0.47) (0.48) 
Corporate Tax 0.10 0.35 
(0.30) (0.37) 
Sales Tax 0.09 0.09 
(0.27) (0.36) 
Property Tax -0.52 -0.08 
(0.33) (0.27) 
Disclosure -0.17 0.75 
(0.32) (0.49) 
Conservative Ideology (lag) -0.04 0.25 
(0.36) (0.54) 
GSP per capita (log) -0.96 8.25*** 
(2.87) (2.69) 
Unemployment rate -0.09 0.04 
(0.18) (0.11) 
State-specific time trend Yes No 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%  Note: N=600. The dependent variable is the 
percent of total generation attributed to renewable energy sources (0-100). All 
specifications include state and year fixed effects.  
 
 
 
   
 112 
Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
As shown in the Figure above, the distribution of the dependent variable for the share of 
renewables in the generation mix is skewed with a lower bound of zero. Given this distribution, a 
Tobit model may seem sensible where the outcome variable, Yi, is only observed when some 
underlying latent variable, Yi*, is greater than zero. The underlying latent variable in this case 
may be the return on a renewable energy investment such that when the return is negative, the 
firm chooses not to invest in the renewable energy system. Using the least squares method will 
underestimate the relationship between the RPS policy and the share of renewable generation.  
In the following Table I present regression results of the model estimated using least 
squares and the fixed effects Tobit model. While the standard errors are biased downward in 
fixed effects Tobit models, Greene (2004) shows that this bias is small when T>5. As expected, 
the estimated coefficient for the RPS policy variable is larger in the fixed effects Tobit model 
compared with the least squares estimate. Given that a positive endogeneity bias is likely 
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(discussed in section 6) I use the more conservative least squares estimation strategy for the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
(1) (2) 
  OLS Tobit 
RPS 0.75*** 0.94*** (0.24) (0.19) 
Observations 600 540 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  Note: 
N=600. The dependent variable is the percent of total 
generation attributed to renewable energy sources (0-
100). All specifications include state time trends and 
state and year fixed effects.  
 
 
An alternative empirical approach is the sample selection model, a generalization of the 
Tobit, where different latent variables determine participation and outcome. In my case, this 
would suggest a latent variable determining the adoption of an RPS policy and a different latent 
variable determining the share of renewable generation. Sample selection models are generally 
only appropriate when at least one explanatory variable influences selection but not the outcome. 
Heckman-type models can be estimated without the extra variable in the selection equation, but 
the identification is based on distributional assumptions rather than variation in explanatory 
variables (Vella 1998). In the case of an RPS policy and renewable generation, it is extremely 
difficult to identify an exogenous variable that would influence RPS adoption but not renewable 
generation.  
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Appendix C 
 
 
In theory, RECs should improve the efficiency of an RPS policy by reducing compliance costs. 
An electric utility can forgo the large fixed costs associated with a renewable generation facility, 
and instead pursue a lower-cost alternative. However, most RPS policies place restrictions on the 
“free trade” of RECs, ultimately reducing efficiency. For example, all but three states impose 
some type of geographical restrictions on REC trading and typically require that the electricity 
underlying the REC be delivered to the region or state. However, many states give preference to 
in-state renewable generation through a credit multiplier (e.g. one megawatt-hour of in-state 
generation counts as 1.5 RECs instead of 1). These policy design features are intended to keep 
some of the ancillary benefits of the RPS, such as economic development or emissions 
reductions, within the state or region that adopted the policy (Holt and Wiser 2007).  
When studying the RPS it is important to account for REC trading to produce unbiased 
estimates. For example, if a utility purchases RECs to satisfy the RPS mandate, but this is 
unaccounted for in the model, I would underestimate the effect of the RPS on renewable 
generation. Unfortunately there is little transparency in REC market activities (Heeter and Bird 
2011). There is inconsistency across REC markets in how RECs are defined and tracked. 
Furthermore, because RECs are traded as part of a contractual agreement between two parties, 
prices are often not reported (Heeter and Bird 2011). The National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory has released some reports documenting REC market transactions, including REC 
prices (e.g. Heeter and Bird 2011). However, this data is incomplete and the authors caution that 
it is only indicative of REC market activity. 
Without access to REC market data I instead account for REC transactions by using 
proxies for the size of the REC market. Yin and Powers (2010) and Carley (2009) take a similar 
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approach. I use two measures: the percent of neighboring states with an RPS policy and the 
percent of states in the REC market, as defined by Bird et al. (2010). The results are reported in 
the table below.  
In specifications (2) and (4) I include the size of REC markets as a covariate. The 
estimated coefficient on the policy variable decreases slightly, suggesting there is a positive 
correlation between the RPS and percent of surrounding states with an RPS. This is consistent 
with the literature on the diffusion of the RPS policy which finds that regional and neighbor 
diffusion are important predictors of adoption (e.g. Chandler 2009). In specifications (3) and (5) 
when these measures are interacted with the policy variable, I estimate positive and statistically 
significant coefficients. In other words, as the percent of surrounding RPS-states increase, the 
share of renewable generation increases in states with an RPS policy. It may be that as 
surrounding states adopt the RPS in-state generation increases to meet the growing REC demand 
of surrounding states, or that competition in the REC market has led states to rely on in-state 
generation. Either way these results reveal the importance of REC market dynamics on 
renewable generation. With more consistency and transparency in REC markets researchers and 
policymakers could gain more insight into how RECs influence the implementation of the RPS. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    Neighbor REC Region 
RPS 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.22 0.74*** 0.19 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28) 
% Neighbor with RPS  
0.50 -0.09 
  
 
(0.49) (0.55) 
  
RPS x % Neighbor with RPS   
1.42*** 
  
  
(0.53) 
  % Region with RPS    
-0.00 -0.00 
   
(0.01) (0.01) 
RPS x % Region with RPS     
0.02*** 
        (0.01) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  Note: 
N=600. The dependent variable is the percent of total generation attributed to renewable energy sources (0-
100). All specifications include state and year fixed effects and state time trends. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state and region-year levels. Estimates of additional covariates are not reported but are available upon 
request. 
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Appendix D 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RPS 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) 
Price of Electricity (Lag, 
Log) 
-1.59* -1.59 -1.59 -1.59 
(0.95) (0.95) (0.95) (1.04) 
Deregulation -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 (0.76) (0.77) (0.75) (0.74) 
Import ratio (lag) 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 (0.94) (0.94) (0.92) (0.88) 
Percent of Other 
Generation (lag) 
-0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Interconnection 
Standard 
-0.30* -0.30** -0.30* -0.30** 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) 
Public Benefits Fund 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.13) 
Green Power Program -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.42) 
Corporate Tax 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) 
Sales Tax 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) 
Property Tax -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) 
Disclosure -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.39) 
Conservative Ideology 
(lag) 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.33) (0.35) 
GSP per capita (log) -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 (2.87) (2.88) (2.93) (2.66) 
Unemployment rate -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Cluster state Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster region-year NREL NERC RTO No 
Cluster year No No No Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  Note: N=600. The dependent variable is the percent of total 
generation attributed to renewable energy sources (0-100). All specifications include 
a state-specific time trend and state and year fixed effects. NERC refers to electric 
reliability regions, RTO refers to regional transmission organizations.  
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Appendix E 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
RPS 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Conservative Ideology (lag) -0.04   (0.36) 
  LCV House Score  
-0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
 Democratic Governor   
0.12 
  
(0.14) 
Price of Electricity (Lag, Log) -1.59* -1.59 -1.66* (0.95) (0.95) (0.95) 
Deregulation -0.37 -0.37 -0.36 (0.76) (0.76) (0.75) 
Import ratio (lag) 0.87 0.87 0.90 
(0.94) (0.94) (0.95) 
Percent of Other Generation (lag) -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Interconnection Standard -0.30* -0.30* -0.30* 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) 
Public Benefits Fund 0.21 0.22 0.20 (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
Green Power Program -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) 
Corporate Tax 0.10 0.11 0.10 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
Sales Tax 0.09 0.09 0.06 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Property Tax -0.52 -0.52 -0.54* 
(0.33) (0.32) (0.32) 
Disclosure -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) 
GSP per capita (log) -0.96 -1.00 -0.98 (2.87) (2.81) (2.81) 
Unemployment rate -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  Note: N=600. The dependent variable is the percent of total 
generation attributed to renewable energy sources (0-100). All specifications include 
state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state and region-year 
levels. 
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Appendix F 
 
 
(1) (2) 
  All Excluding Talkers 
Treatment Group x Week 2 5.12** 5.30** (2.02) (2.29) 
Week 2 1.46 1.92 (1.37) (1.48) 
Driving event (=1) -0.33 0.60 (1.85) (2.15) 
Price of gasoline (Log) 5.29 9.83 (23.36) (27.91) 
Constant 95.27*** 89.52** (28.59) (34.15) 
Observations 232 190 
    Treatment 57 42 
    Control 59 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%  Note: Talkers refers to participants who discussed 
the study with co-workers who were also participating. All specifications 
include individual fixed effects.   
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment Group x  
Week 2 x Male 
0.95 
    (3.81) 
    Week 2 x Male -0.45     (2.67) 
    Treatment Group x  
Week 2 x Age <55 years  
-4.59 
   
 
(4.03) 
   Week 2 x Age <55 years  
2.94 
   
 
(2.49) 
   Treatment Group x  
Week 2 x College   
-2.94 
  
  
(5.22) 
  Week 2 x College   
5.50 
  
  
(4.51) 
  Treatment Group x  
Week 2 x Income <$100k    
5.22 
 
   
(4.26) 
 Week 2 x Income <$100k    
-4.01 
 
   
(3.01) 
 Treatment Group x  
Week 2 x Own     
-0.77 
    
(7.46) 
Week 2 x Own     
-2.06 
    
(6.61) 
Treatment Group x  
Week 2 
4.73 8.78*** 8.02* 2.85 5.68 
(2.94) (3.23) (4.71) (2.73) (6.99) 
Week 2 1.65 -0.81 -3.35 3.58** 3.29 (2.05) (1.61) (4.26) (1.59) (6.53) 
Driving event (=1) -0.34 -0.62 -0.43 -0.58 -0.54 (1.88) (1.96) (1.90) (2.00) (1.97) 
Price of gasoline (Log) 5.42 4.77 6.93 5.34 7.83 (24.11) (23.03) (23.35) (23.23) (24.19) 
Constant 95.02*** 95.58*** 92.94*** 89.80*** 92.30*** (29.60) (28.17) (28.58) (28.64) (29.57) 
Observations 232 232 232 206 232 
    Treatment 57 57 57 53 57 
    Control 59 59 59 50 59 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Estimated coefficients for price of 
gasoline and unusual driving events are not reported.  
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(1) 
Treatment Group x Week 3 x Above Max 0.05 
(0.09) 
Week 3 x Above Max -0.15** 
(0.07) 
Week 2 x Above Max -0.01 
(0.04) 
Treatment Group x Week 3 x Above Avg but Below Max -0.09 
(0.10) 
Week 3 x Above Avg but Below Max -0.07 
(0.07) 
Week 2 x Above Avg but Below Max -0.02 
(0.05) 
Treatment Group x Week 3  0.08 
(0.07) 
Week 3 0.00 
(0.07) 
Week 2 0.04 
(0.04) 
Price of Fuel (Log) 0.44*** 
(0.11) 
Driving Event -0.01 
(0.04) 
Drive in Snow 0.01 
(0.06) 
Constant 2.80*** 
(0.14) 
Observations 105 
    Treatment 16 
    Control 19 
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: The dependent variable is fuel economy (log). All specifications include individual fixed effects. 
Top refers to individuals who consistently performed above the peer maximum. Middle refers to 
individuals who consistently performed above the peer average but below the peer maximum. 
 
 
 
 
